“Whore.... Do you think this is a brothel? You must meet the production demand here. If you want to continue to work here, listen to us.”

This nasty threat is a snapshot of the harassment that supervisors and managers heap on many Bangladeshi garment workers. Workers say many factory bosses lash out like this for things as simple as attempting to exercise the right to refuse overtime or take sick leave.

In the same factory, one manager pressured multiple garment workers to spend nights with him at a hotel. Sick of his unwanted sexual advances, workers summoned the courage to confront him as a group. He denied it. His managers didn’t respond. But then the women who protested the harassment faced retaliation. Managers made their lives hell—making them work longer hours with higher production targets—and labelled them “unproductive workers.”

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If garment workers didn’t face retaliation for exposing sexual harassment, many of them would be screaming #MeToo at the top of their lungs. Their experiences are part of the global crisis of workplace sexual harassment, less visible in places like garment factories but no less important than the high-profile cases involving Hollywood, the media, and political figures.  

Governments and employers need to take a hard look at whether laws, policies, and practices to prevent, identify, and remedy sexual harassment are working—not just in their own companies, but also in their supply chains.

Over the last five years, Human Rights Watch has documented sexual harassment in garment factories in Cambodia, Bangladesh, Burma, and Pakistan. We found that abuses were rife, legal protections did not exist or were weakly enforced, and efforts to audit factories or monitor for harassment were ineffective.

Governments have the primary human rights obligation to combat sexual harassment. But even when they adopt laws or issue policies, implementation has often been dismal.  

The High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court issued guidelines in 2009 on sexual harassment. India enacted a law to tackle workplace sexual harassment in 2013. Both seem to have had little effect in the garment factories in Bangladesh and India. Workers we interviewed in Bangladesh this year did not know about the guidelines and were not aware of any cases in which harassers were held accountable.

Similarly, in Cambodia, workplace sexual harassment is forbidden under the labor law. But workers said that it was common for supervisors and managers to pinch garment workers’ buttocks, use sexual expletives, and grope workers while “teaching” them how to perform their tasks. The Cambodian labor law limits the use of short-term contracts, but they are common.  Workers on these contracts have plenty to fear. Complain about sexual harassment and your contract probably won’t be renewed.

Apparel brands also have a responsibility to prevent human rights abuses, including sexual harassment, throughout their supply chains and to identify and address any abuses. But, as with governments, their efforts are falling short.

Individual brands, and brands that are part of multi-stakeholder initiatives, rely on brand compliance teams or third-party monitoring of factories to address human rights risks in their supply chain. But these methods are not suited to spotting sexual harassment. Many brands hire third parties to conduct code-of-conduct audits or audits applying standards developed by multi-stakeholder initiatives. In theory, such audits are supposed to examine workplace discrimination, including sexual harassment. But they are often not up to the task.

We found that multiple factors impede the effectiveness of factory-based audits in identifying labor abuses, including sexual harassment. Auditors frequently meet with workers in mixed groups for short periods. This is not conducive to revealing sexual harassment, which is often stigmatized. Workers also say they are intimidated because these discussions are inside factory walls, so managers know exactly who is speaking with the monitors.    

It's not only governments and brands that are struggling with how they monitor for and deal with sexual harassment. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has tried, with very inconsistent results, to identify sexual harassment. Better Factories Cambodia, an ILO factory-monitoring program that is considered one of the best models, reported in 2017 that its program detected “no sexual harassment” in almost every factory monitored. Contrast this with a 2012 ILO study on gender equality in the garment industry, which found that 54 percent of workers surveyed reported harassment. Clearly, when it comes to detecting and correcting labor abuses, methodology matters.

Governments need to enact and enforce labor laws, including those specifically on sexual harassment in the workplace. They should ensure that labor laws are not weakened to create more precarious contracts out of a desire to be more “investor friendly.” Workers would benefit from a comprehensive review of sexual harassment responses, with meaningful input from women and workers’ organizations.  

Brands should invest in specialized training programs for supplier factories to prevent and respond to workplace sexual harassment. They should support workers’ freedom of association, especially the creation of workplace committees against harassment, that have input from garment workers and experts, including on women’s rights. Brands should also ensure that periodic monitoring on gender issues includes the active participation of women workers and experts, including on women’s rights.

Finally, a brand committed to gender equality in its supplier factories will move beyond rhetoric and rectify purchasing practices that contribute to precarious contracts. Workers on short-term, daily wages, and other casual forms of employment are far more vulnerable than workers who have employment security and legal protections against arbitrary dismissals. Brands should adopt strategies to enhance and facilitate workers’ ability to bargain collectively for better working conditions, and to promote more stable employment.  

Garment workers have long paid the price of failed efforts to combat sexual harassment. They need the support of government and industry to stop this scourge. The boss who calls them whores and makes them work when they are sick should be the one who gets punished.

The Burmese army carried out systematic killings and rape of several hundred Rohingya Muslims in Tula Toli village in Rakhine State on August 30, 2017. The massacre was part of the military’s campaign of ethnic cleansing that has forced more than 645,000 Rohingya to flee to neighboring Bangladesh since late August. The security force attacked several thousand villagers in Tula Toli, known officially as Min Gyi. Human Rights Watch documented how security forces trapped Rohingya villagers along a riverbank and proceeded to kill and rape men, women, and children, and torch the village.
 

Beginning in late August, Bangladesh received a massive influx of over 655,000 Rohingya refugees escaping a campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Burmese military after a militant attack in Rakhine State, Burma. Bangladesh sought urgent international humanitarian assistance to provide for the refugees.

Authorities failed to hold security forces responsible for serious human rights violations including secret detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings.

Bangladesh took a massive step backward on women’s and girls’ rights in 2017, passing legislation in February permitting girls under 18 years old to marry under “special circumstances,” eliminating the minimum age for marriages in this exception.

In response to protests in December 2016 by garment workers seeking higher wages, factory owners dismissed over 1,500 workers and authorities arrested 38 union leaders and workers on unsubstantiated criminal charges.

Refugees

After an August 25 attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on police posts in northern Rakhine State, the Burmese military began a catastrophic and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing, carrying out armed attacks on Rohingya Muslim villagers, raping and sexually assaulting women and girls, and torching entire villages.

The over 630,000 Rohingya refugees created an unprecedented strain on Bangladesh’s already meagre resources. Humanitarian workers have struggled to meet needs in sprawling informal and formal refugee camps.

Bangladesh called for international pressure to ensure the swift return of refugees to their homes in Burma. In November, Burma and Bangladesh announced an agreement to repatriate the Rohingya refugees. However, at time of writing, serious concerns remained about the proposed repatriation process, including when and where the refugees would be resettled, if returns would be voluntary, the documentation required, freedom of movement, and the state of “temporary camps” called for as part of the resettlement process.

Security Force Abuse and Impunity

Bangladesh security forces—particularly the Detective Branch of the police, Bangladesh Border Guards (BGB), the Directorate General Forces Inspectorate (DGFI), and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)—have a long history of enjoying impunity for serious violations including arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, a pattern that did not abate in 2017.

Law enforcement authorities continued to arrest opposition activists and militant suspects, holding them in secret detention for long periods before producing some in court. Several others, according to security forces, were killed in “gunfights,” leading to concerns over extrajudicial killings. At time of writing, scores remained victims of enforced disappearances.

Freedom of Expression and Attacks on Civil Society

Civil society groups faced pressure from both state and non-state actors, including death threats and attacks from extremist groups, and escalating harassment and surveillance by security forces. In June 2017, Islamist leaders threatened to “break every bone” of Sultana Kamal, a prominent Bangladeshi lawyer and rights activist, after she publicly opposed their campaign to dismantle a statue of Lady Justice outside the Supreme Court on the grounds that it constituted “idolatry,” violating Islamic tenets.

Freedom of expression was severely limited as authorities used overly broad laws to stifle dissent or perceived criticism. The government continued to use Section 57 of the Information and Communications Technology Act (ICT Act) to punish critics. The draft Digital Securities Act, designed to replace section 57, proposed even harsher penalties for vaguely defined crimes under national security, defamation, and “hurting religious feelings.”

In 2017, there were at least 30 assaults on journalists, including the February murder of Abdul Hakim Shimul, a reporter for the daily Samakal newspaper, while he covered political unrest in Shahjadpur. In August, the journalist Abdul Latif Morol was arrested for satirical reporting of the death of a goat on Facebook. In early September, police detained two Burmese journalists reporting on the Rohingya crisis and held them for a week before releasing them on bail. After significant international pressure, authorities dropped the charges on October 17 and allowed the two to return home.

The Foreign Donation (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act to control nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) further hindered freedoms of expression and association. The proposed Distortion of the History of Bangladesh Liberation War Crimes Act provides for imprisonment and fines if details of the 1971 war of independence are debated or disputed.  

Minorities

Sporadic attacks and threats against religious minorities continued in 2017. In mid-November, a mob of nearly 20,000 looted and burned down over 30 homes in the majority-Hindu Thakurpara village in Rangpur Sadar, in response to rumors that a villager had published a Facebook post defaming the Prophet Muhammad.

Indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) have for decades faced discrimination, forced displacement, assaults, evictions, and destruction of property by both Bangladeshi security forces and Bengali settlers from the mainland. In June, Bengali rioters burned 100 indigenous homes in Longadu, reportedly while army and police looked on.

Environment

Bangladesh again failed to address its decades-long problem of arsenic in drinking water, with the World Health Organization estimating that 40 million people in the country are affected by arsenic poisoning. In February, three United Nations special rapporteurs published a joint letter raising their concerns which they had sent to the government the previous year, and to which the government had not responded.

In 2017, the government finally began to relocate about a third of the approximately 300 tanneries out of Hazaribagh, a residential area of Dhaka, to a dedicated industrial zone in Savar just outside the capital. The tanneries produce environmentally hazardous waste containing chemicals such as sulfur, ammonium, and chromium.  However, many continue to operate in Hazaribagh, in contravention of multiple High Court orders, most recently in March. In November, the government announced that the move to Savar had been delayed again and would not be completed until 2019.

The Hill Tracts region suffered massive landslides in mid-June after several days of heavy rainfall, killing more than 160 people and displacing thousands. Environmental activists blamed decades of unregulated settlement and deforestation due to poor enforcement of existing laws.

The government pushed forward with plans for the controversial India-backed Rampal coal power plant in 2017, despite significant concerns about air and water pollution, and risk to the Sundarbans mangrove forest, a UNESCO world heritage site.

Labor Rights

Bangladeshi authorities failed to implement their commitments under the Sustainability Compact in 2017, including amendments to the labor laws governing Export Processing Zones to bring them in line with international standards. In general, factory officials were not held accountable for attacks, threats, and retaliation against workers, particularly those involved with unions.

From December 2016 to February 2017, the government and garment manufacturers cracked down on workers for demanding higher wages, dismissing workers and arresting union leaders based on vague or repealed offenses from the draconian Special Powers Act of 1974.

Although the global garment union IndustriALL, the government, and the garment manufacturers’ association reached an agreement in February after significant international and corporate pressure to release the 34 workers and union leaders, they continued to face criminal cases.

The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, a platform of North American retailers that sets timeframes and accountability for safety inspections and training programs, announced in 2017 that it would not extend its tenure after mid-2018. The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, a European counterpart, decided to extend its tenure until 2021. Both were set up in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza building collapse in 2013 that killed more than 1,000 workers.

Women’s and Girls’ Rights

With among the highest rates of early marriage in the world, the government had pledged to end marriage of children younger than 15 by 2021, and marriage younger than 18 by 2041. However, in February 2017, the government greatly undermined progress toward these goals by approving a law that permits girls under age 18 to marry under “special circumstances,” such as “accidental” or “illegal pregnancy,” with permission from their parents and a court. There is no age limit to how early girls can marry under this exception.

Stalking, sexual harassment, and violence against women and girls continued in 2017. In Bogra, a city in north Bangladesh, a university student accused Tufan Sarkar, a trade union leader linked to the ruling Awami League, of abducting and raping her in July. In an attempt to silence the victim, Sarkar picked up her and her mother, tortured them for hours, and then tonsured their heads, sparking widespread public outrage and protests in the city. Police arrested Sarkar, his wife, and several associates two weeks later, and filed charges in October.  

Also in July, a student leader, and apparent repeat offender at Sirajganj Government College publicly harassed and assaulted a student because she protested against his repeated threats to sexually assault her. He was later arrested on assault charges.

Indigenous women and girls faced multiple forms of discrimination due to their gender, indigenous identity, and socio-economic status and were especially vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence.

Overseas Workers

Millions of Bangladeshis work abroad, sending home remittances worth billions of dollars. In 2017, 100,000 women migrated overseas, mostly to Gulf countries, for domestic work. Many Bangladeshi migrant workers have reported being deprived of food and forced to endure psychological, physical, and sexual abuse. In some cases, such abuses amounted to forced labor or trafficking.

Bangladesh has set a minimum salary for domestic workers in the Gulf equivalent to roughly US$200 per month, the lowest minimum salary of all sending countries. Its regional embassies do not provide adequate protection and assistance to many Bangladeshi nationals there.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Although the government took some steps in recent years, such as declaring legal recognition of a third gender category for hijras, policy implementation remains weak and sexual and gender minorities remained under constant pressure and threat.

The government twice rejected recommendations during its Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to repeal the colonial-era law forbidding same-sex conduct. In May, the Rapid Action Battalion raided a gathering in Dhaka, arresting 28 men and publicly accusing them of homosexuality and drug possession, flouting privacy rights.

Key International Actors

The UN secretary-general and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees denounced the “ethnic cleansing” campaign in Burma against the Rohingya. Several governments pledged aid to assist the refugees, but humanitarian agencies asked for more. In December, Bangladesh sponsored a special session of the UNHRC to bring attention to the plight of Rohingya in Burma.

India and the United States remained largely silent on the country’s human rights record in their public statements in 2017, save in relation to the Burmese Rohingya refugee crisis, when they expressed support for Bangladesh’s efforts in dealing with the massive influx of refugees. However, the US did allocate $32 million in humanitarian aid for Rohingya in Bangladesh.

The UK government raised some concerns about the rights situation in Bangladesh, but without sufficient vigour or consistency, and preferred private statements to strong statements of public concern. In November, UK Prime Minister Theresa May publicly condemned the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya and pledged to work with Bangladesh and other regional partners to deal with the crisis.

In February and March respectively, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Human Rights Committee raised concerns about the increasing number of enforced disappearances and the lack of investigations and accountability. The Bangladeshi government ignored the statements, as well as repeated requests for visits by UN special rapporteurs and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

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(New York, January 18, 2018) – Bangladesh authorities failed to respond to repeated and serious allegations of secret detentions, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, denying the abuses instead of holding perpetrators accountable, Human Rights Watch said in its World Report 2018. Although the government did not refoul Rohingya refugees seeking sanctuary from across the Burmese border, Bangladeshi citizens themselves saw no reprieve in their quest for justice.

In the 643-page World Report, its 28th edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 90 countries. In his introductory essay, Executive Director Kenneth Roth writes that political leaders willing to stand up for human rights principles showed that it is possible to limit authoritarian populist agendas. When combined with mobilized publics and effective multilateral actors, these leaders demonstrated that the rise of anti-rights governments is not inevitable.

Starting in late August, Bangladesh saw over 655,000 Rohingya refugees cross the border from Northern Rakhine State in Burma fleeing a campaign of rape, arson, and killings by the Burmese military that amounted to crimes against humanity. Bangladesh is already host to hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees, including about 80,000 who similarly fled to Bangladesh between late 2016 and early 2017. While Bangladesh does not officially recognize the majority of the Rohingya as refugees, the government has allowed those seeking shelter to enter the country.

“Bangladesh deserves credit for not forcibly returning Rohingya refugees, and for doing what it can with strained resources to provide safety for them for the time being,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “However recurring plans to move the refugees to uninhabitable islands or to return them to Burma without key citizenship rights and protections remained a concern.”

In domestic rights concerns, scores of Bangladeshis remained victims of enforced disappearances, even as law enforcement authorities continued to target both opposition supporters and militant suspects. Security forces, including members of the army, responsible for serious human rights violations continued, in the main, to be free and unaccountable. Despite evidence of flawed trials and coerced confessions, the High Court upheld the death penalty against nearly 140 members of the Bangladesh Rifles, as the border security force was formerly known, who are accused of participating in a deadly mutiny, killing officers and raping their female relatives.

Civil society groups, including the media, continued to face pressure from both state and non-state actors, while dozens of Bangladeshis were arrested for criticizing the government or the political leadership on Facebook.

Although the official government policy is to eliminate child marriage, in February 2017 the government passed a law permitting girls under 18 years of age to marry under special circumstances – effectively eliminating the minimum age for marriage in this exception. The government failed to take steps to end discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In May, Bangladesh’s notorious Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) raided a gathering in Dhaka, arrested 28 men, paraded them in front of the media while saying they were gay, and accused them of drug possession.

“It is hard to find a bright spot in Bangladesh’s record on human rights in the past years,” said Adams. “Particularly as the country heads into general elections in 2019, it is vital to restore the rule of law, and end all efforts to silence dissent.”

In October 2017 Human Rights Watch interviewed six transgender men living in different parts of Bangladesh. All of them spoke of bullying at school, barriers to employment, difficulty accessing health care, as well as harassment and verbal abuse in both public and private spaces. On top of these difficulties, they feared for their safety amid a climate of impunity for attacks on minorities by religious extremists and feared that, if they were targeted, authorities would deny that they were targeted because of their gender identity rather than come forcefully to their defense. Interviewees also highlighted the difficulties that arise because their gender identity does not match the gender listed on diplomas, passports, or other legal documents, including their ability to get jobs and to travel.  

Human Rights Watch calls on the Bangladesh government to better protect the human rights of transgender men by developing legal mechanisms that allow transgender individuals to change their official gender on legal documents and by enacting an anti-discrimination law that expressly prohibits discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation.

Context: Rising Fears

Transgender (or trans) men have a male gender identity that does not conform to the female sex declared at birth. There is a dearth of information on the experience of such men in Bangladesh. Many of the trans men Human Rights Watch initially reached out to chose not to be interviewed because of security concerns, and those we did interview requested anonymity. Accordingly, we have used pseudonyms and withheld information about their ages and the exact locations of the interviews. Four of the interviews with transgender men were conducted in person and two were over the phone.

While the experiences and fears of the trans men presented here cannot be said to be nationally representative without additional research, there is reason to believe they are widely shared. For one thing, all of the trans men we spoke to said other trans men faced the same threats and vulnerability. For another, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populations in Bangladesh more generally face a climate of hostility that has been documented previously by others.

In a 2015 report, Bangladeshi LGBT rights groups noted that “[v]isibility…can be life-threatening and isolating due to social stigma, religious beliefs and family values that create a hostile environment for LGBT individuals.” Following a 2015 visit, the United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of religious belief said, “Sexual minorities do not find much acceptance in the society and often experience verbal or other abuse.” In a 2009 UN human rights review, the government of Bangladesh received a recommendation to train law enforcement and judicial offers to protect women, children, and LGBT people “and adopt further measures to ensure protection of these persons against violence and abuse.” The government accepted the recommendation with regard to women and children, but said: “The specific recommendation on sexual orientation cannot be accepted.… Indeed, sexual orientation is not an issue in Bangladesh.” While the experience of trans men is in some respects typical of sexual minorities in Bangladesh, they are all the more vulnerable because they visibly transgress societal norms through their gender expression.

In a 2015 manual on sexual and gender minorities, the National Human Rights commission acknowledged that members of the police physically and sexually assault LGBT people, and arbitrarily arrest them based on their appearance.  Bangladesh’s notorious Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) raided a gathering in Dhaka on May 19, 2017, arrested 28 men, paraded them in front of the media while saying they were gay, and accused them of drug possession. A RAB official explained that the men were arrested before they could engage in “homosexual acts” which is why they were not charged with violating the colonial-era law criminalizing same-sex sexual behavior.  

The current political context in Bangladesh gives additional reasons for fear. Since 2013, assailants have carried out approximately 28 “machete attacks” on bloggers, activists, and religious minorities. At the same time, the government of Bangladesh has carried out a sustained clampdown on freedom of expression, prosecuting scores for their social media content. The murder of two LGBT rights activists, Xulhaz Mannan and Tonoy Mahbub, in April 2016 had a long-term chilling effect. Shortly after the murders, the Bangladeshi home minister noted that one of the victims had “worked to promote gay rights” emphasizing that “[t]his does not fit in our society.” In the aftermath of the murders and weak government response, many LGBT activists went into hiding while others permanently fled Bangladesh.

In an open letter to Mahbub, an LGBT activist described the continued chilling effect one year after the murders: “You went about your daily life without ever concealing your identity on Facebook, the theatre or from your family. But everything has changed since your death. We live in a constant state of fear and anxiety. We are constantly learning new ways to conceal our identities on social media to ensure that we don’t inadvertently leave behind a single trace of ourselves.” 

Trans men interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they fear they may be killed if religious hardliners find out that they identify as transgender or are perceived to be gay or lesbian. For example, Nandini, a transgender man told Human Rights Watch: “Many people assume I'm lesbian or gay based on how I carry myself. That assumption threatens my life.” Jamal explained why he had little hope that government authorities would seek to protect trans men from such attacks: “If we were targeted by extremists our government wouldn’t provide any legal or moral support or justice. Since the government hasn’t even recognized the issues of trans men, there is no possibility that they would help us.” Jamal also expressed fears of being prosecuted under section 377 if he were to seek government assistance due a lack of understanding of what it means to be transgender.

For trans men, this climate of fear is exacerbated by social marginalization and discrimination as well as legal impediments to accessing employment, health care, and education, including the absence of a mechanism for changing one’s gender on legal documents, as noted above. These barriers and the climate of insecurity has left Jamal feeling extremely frustrated:

What's the point of me living here? I can't transition. If I do manage to transition elsewhere no one is going to accept me. The government won't recognize me. Society won't accept me. My parents won't accept me. So I really don't have anything here. I don’t have my identity and eventually they'll probably just kill me anyway and say, “This one is like this, let's kill her.”

The climate of fear fuels emotional distress. Abed, a trans man, said to Human Rights Watch:

How would you feel if 24/7 you thought about the fact that if anyone finds out about you, then they will kill you? It's a terrifying reality. And it's what I live with. There's a lot of religious extremists in my neighborhood. They're dangerous. I avoid leaving my house unless I really need to because I fear who might notice me.

Omar described to Human Rights Watch the consequences of the lack of accountability: “If word spread to others about my gender identity, then anything could happen. If anyone decided they wanted to kill me, they easily could. They wouldn't have to face any punishment for it.” Jamal connected the murders of Mannan and Mahbub to his fears of his stalker, who knows of his gender identity: “If he tells an extremist group that I'm a homosexual then it's obvious what will happen. Or if he spreads this information some other way. Then extremist groups will do what they do - as they did with Xulhaz.”

The widespread fear has made it difficult for trans men to even arrange meetings. “Considering the current climate in Bangladesh, of course we're scared to meet with each other,” Nandini said to Human Rights Watch. 

Bullying, Harassment, and Exclusion from Education

Each of the trans men interviewed by Human Rights Watch described experiences of discrimination when they were in school. They said that bullying and harassment in school was exacerbated by strict uniform requirements and pressure from school authorities to dress in a feminine manner. The trans men Human Rights Watch spoke to faced bullying and harassment from fellow students as well as school officials. This contributed to a hostile school environment that made it difficult for students to concentrate on the material or participate in class and, they said, contributed to low grades and frequent absences. Omar, for example, struggled to concentrate in primary school because he was forced to sit with girls and wear a dress as part of the uniform, and as a result he would cry in order to be excused from school. In contrast, in secondary school he was able to sit with the boys and wear a boy’s uniform. He attended school regularly, and received better grades.

Most interviewees described school administrators who would enforce discriminatory school policies that excluded trans men from fully participating in the school environment and made them feel even more isolated. In Bangladesh, it is normal for very young girls to have extremely short hair, but for older girls in late secondary school, it is normal to have long hair. Nandini was verbally harassed in front of the entire school: “A teacher gave me a warning and said I had to grow out my hair and come back and show her two weeks later. She asked me why I keep my hair short and what's wrong with me. She said I'm in class ten, why would I have short hair?” For Adnan, mistreatment began when he attempted to enroll himself in a girl’s secondary school. The only secondary education options available to Adnan were gender segregated. The head teacher told him he would need to grow out his hair and wear a dress and said, “[Looking at you] I had no idea you were a girl, how can you enroll here?"

The trans men said that when school officials verbally harass transgender students in public, it can further embolden fellow students to do the same. Transgender students felt they had no authority figure to turn to for support or to hold other students accountable for their verbal harassment. Abed did not have friends in school and faced constant bullying when teachers left the classroom:

One day a classmate said to me, in front of the entire class, “Why are you like this? Why do you do this? Why are you so ridiculous? You’re crazy. You’re a lesbian.” She would curse at me. This would happen frequently. I never complained to any of the other teachers because I knew none of them would be sympathetic. All of the teachers had issues with me because I wouldn’t dress or act like a girl.

Jamal, a trans man, feared attracting the attention of teachers when other students would call him a homosexual or a lesbian: “I could never say anything to them [other students] because I didn’t want it to escalate. I was scared that the teachers or my parents would find out.”

Harassment and discrimination did not end at secondary school. Trans men recounted similar experiences at the hands of administrators, instructors, and fellow students in higher education settings. Nandini described the first day of class when a professor taking attendance called Nandini’s name and asked: “‘Are you a boy or a girl?’ Then the other students said, ‘Professor, you noticed after all this time, but we’ve been confused since day one. We've been taking classes together for the last two years and we're still confused." Then [the professor] said, ‘You're a girl but you're dressing like a boy?’ I didn't go to his class for the next week.”

Some university policies reinforce stereotypical gender roles and, in an effort to evade such expectations, trans men are unable to partake freely in educational opportunities. Adnan had initially wanted to major in Business Administration but upon learning that students within that major must dress formally for presentations which would mean wearing a sari, he chose a different major. Nandini said his instructors have told him they reduced his grades because he refused to dress in formal, traditionally feminine clothing when conducting presentations.

The harassment Tahmid faced from his fellow students escalated when living in a gender-segregated residential hall: “Another student went to the administrator that would oversee the hostel and said, ‘He acts like a boy. He is a boy. Why does he live in the girls’ hostel? Kick him out.’ The administrator didn't take her very seriously but later had a talk with me and asked, ‘Why are you like this? Do you have your period or not? Why do you dress like this?’” After this incident, Tahmid learned that he must conceal his gender identity from everyone around him.  

Barriers to Employment

Due to widespread prejudice, trans men face significant barriers in securing employment when their gender expression does not match the gender listed on their official documentation, including ID documents and diplomas. Formal wear in Bangladesh is gender specific and wearing masculine pants and a shirt can be read as unprofessional for women. Nandini explained the difficulties of dressing in ways that are not traditionally feminine: “In an [employment] interview someone asked if I always look like this or present myself this way. Do I always dress like this? I was asked this in 3-4 interviews.”

Trans men who secured employment described harassment from other colleagues. Tahmid had always dressed in traditional men’s clothing since he began working and had not faced any issues. This situation abruptly changed, however, after Tahmid confided in a colleague that he planned to take hormones to begin the transition process. The colleague informed others and, soon after, Tahmid’s supervisor explained that others had complained about Tahmid’s clothes: “He wanted to know why I dressed like this since it's unprofessional. And if I didn't change, then he'd be forced to take further action. He said that if I wanted to continue working there, I would need to change the way I dressed.”

The difficulty of finding alternative employment leads individuals to endure discrimination and exploitation in the workplace. Despite being unhappy in his current job, and wishing to leave, Omar has heard from other trans men that employment can be difficult if not hostile and dangerous: “I can’t leave because I can’t dress this way in other jobs. I would have to act like a woman in terms of clothes, hair, etc..” Most of the trans men Human Rights Watch spoke to were university students whose futures seemed bleak to them because they anticipated the difficulties of attaining employment. For example, Abed told Human Rights Watch: “I've heard from so many people that because of their clothes and gender expression, they weren't able to get jobs.”

Accessing Transition-Related Health Care

Trans men face significant difficulties in accessing medical care and mental health care. This is all the more alarming considering that all the trans men interviewed by Human Rights Watch had attempted suicide at least once and, in some cases, a few times in their lives. Tahmid described his thought process: “A lot of times, I thought I'd be better off dead. Sometimes the pain was so bad that I couldn't stand it. How many issues can one person endure? At home, at school, at work.” Abed’s thoughts demonstrate the importance of access to mental health care for transgender individuals in Bangladesh: “My main thought was, what's the point of staying alive? I have nothing in my life. Because I don't see anyone else like me. I was extremely depressed because my parents would repeatedly tell me to wear girl's clothes and act like a girl.”

Trans men in Bangladesh struggle to access medical and mental health care from providers who understand what it means to be transgender. Tahmid met with a psychiatrist who was the head of a large, well-established clinic in Dhaka, and explained his gender identity: “He said to me, ‘Is this even possible? This never happens to anyone.’ Then he said, ‘You should have sex with a man, then you’ll be fixed’ I wanted to kick him. He suggested I watch porn and once I’d become aroused from watching porn, then I should have sex with a man so I would be cured.” In contrast, Abed was referred to a psychiatrist by a local NGO that deals with LGBT issues, and said the psychiatrist was supportive and even explained to his parents what it means to be trans.

When Omar was exploring opportunities to begin the medical transition process, he went to a doctor recommended by friends who knew about his identity. The doctor conducted several tests and then said that “everything was normal” and there was no need for Omar to transition. Omar described the encounter: “The doctor had no understanding of my mentality. For the doctor, it was entirely physical. Doctors in our country don't understand what trans men, trans women or hijras are. They don't understand that they're different categories. So how can they help us?”

The government should require that medical schools include formal education about health care for transgender individuals within their curriculum, which should adhere to the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) standards of care. Without any meaningful inclusion of transgender identities that adheres to WPATH standards of care in the curriculum for medical and mental health providers, positive outcomes such as Tahmid’s will not become the norm.

Most of the trans men interviewed by Human Rights Watch struggled to find any medical doctors to support them in the medical transition process. As a result, they have accepted that they will need to travel outside of Bangladesh in order to undergo this process, which poses problems at border control for those whose physical appearance does not match the gender listed in their passport.

Harassment and Prejudice in Families

Trans men who spoke to Human Rights Watch reported varying levels of openness about their gender identity with their families. Some feared their family’s rejection and completely hid their identity. For example, Jamal leaves his house wearing traditionally feminine clothing, changes into pants and a t-shirt in a public restroom, and then changes back to his original outfit before reentering the house. When explaining how traditional his family is, Jamal said: “If they can't even accept the clothes I want to wear, how could they possibly accept my gender identity or sexual orientation?”

Others were more open with their parents from a young age. When Abed was about 13 years old, before he learned what it means to be trans, he tried explaining how he felt to his mother: “I tried telling my mom, ‘Mom, when you tell me to wear girl's clothes, then it makes me want to kill myself. That's how awful it makes me feel.’ My mom replied, ‘You need to return to Allah’s path and seek forgiveness. You can't say these things, it's a sin.’ I had nothing left to say. She shut me up. That's when I realized that my family will never understand me.” Nevertheless, Abed persisted and when he was about 20 years old, attempted to explain what it means to be transgender to his parents and solicited the help of a sympathetic psychiatrist who also spoke to his parents. Despite his efforts, Abed said his parents struggled to accept him: “They regularly cry and ask ‘Why did Allah do this to you? What's going to happen to you? You have no future.’”

Adnan dresses in masculine clothing with his family’s support as they assume he is a “tomboy”: a girl who engages in behavior traditionally considered masculine. Since he was two or three years old, Adnan wanted to wear his elder brother’s clothing as opposed to his own. Adnan’s father, who found his behavior amusing, bought him boy’s clothes and referred to him as his son when he was young. Adnan’s family, however, do not understand what it means to be transgender and he fears their rejection if he were to broach the topic.  

Most interviewees feared what would happen if they were to discuss the topic with their families or what will happen as they grow older and their families expect them to marry. Jamal explained: “If I stay here [in Bangladesh] then my parents will marry me off. Or they'll ban me from the house. I'll become a pariah in society.” An elder in Abed’s family who knew that he identifies as transgender articulated a widespread attitude in Bangladesh: “‘Marry her off quickly. Once she's married and has kids, she'll be fixed.’"

Omar, who has served as a mentor to other trans men and worked closely in an unofficial capacity with an LGBT organization, explained how prevalent such attitudes are: “There are many trans people who face such immense pressure from their families that they get married and start families. Even though they don't want to. And then everyday they are tortured by their lives. This happens to trans men, transwomen and lesbians.” The psychiatrist Abed consulted advised him not to tell his family about his gender identity: “‘If you tell your family, they might force you to get married and torture you in various ways so there’s no need to tell them.’”  

For most of the trans men who spoke to Human Rights Watch, stigma and discrimination began in the home and was the source of many problems and concerns about their future. Omar explained the importance of family acceptance: “If our families would accept us then society, and everyone else will accept us as well. If our family doesn’t accept us, then no one else will.” 

Harassment in Public Places

All interviewees said they had been harassed or ridiculed when walking down the street because of their gender expression. Constant verbal abuse and harassment sends a message that people in their communities despise them and reinforces concerns about their safety because they fear catching the attention of anyone associated with violent Islamist groups who may assume they are gay.

The trans men Human Rights Watch spoke to would frequently hear people say, “boy or girl?” or question whether they were a hijra, an identity category for people who are assigned male at birth but develop a feminine identity. Being called a hijra can carry a negative connotation since hijras occupy a marginalized position in society and are often perceived as a lower-caste group.

Adnan described feeling dehumanized due to harassment: “The way they stare is the worst. It’s as if I’m a different species and not a human being.” Like Adnan, other trans men have normalized verbal harassment and its emotional toll: “I've heard this [all] so much and so frequently that I'm used to it by now. When I first used to hear these comments, I'd feel terrible. I still feel bad every time I hear it, but not as bad as I felt before. I had to get used to it, because it's not going to change.” Nandini has also come to expect verbal harassment: “I've accepted that wherever I go, people will look at me strangely. And if I want to buy something from a store and there's other people there, then they'll start talking about me.”

The Consequences of Verbal Abuse 

Verbal abuse and harassment that people face due to their gender expression can create or enhance negative self-image, shape public opinion, instill fear and shame in people, and inhibit their ability to access public spaces and seek redress or justice. For most interviewees, verbal harassment reinforced feelings of inferiority and isolation. Strangers would sometimes ask Tahmid if he was a boy or girl: “I became used to it, but even then it felt awful to hear. I used to wish I could become invisible.”

In addition to stares and verbal harassment, Abed has also been ridiculed:

I was walking down the street one day and there were some boys passing by me and then one of them said loudly, “look there goes a hijra” and pointed at me. They were staring at me, laughing amongst themselves and trying to get my attention by calling me a hijra. I didn't look at them. I just kept my head down and came home. This has happened several times. With different groups of people.

For Tahmid, common forms of verbal abuse compounded with widespread discrimination and rejection from family members led to suicidal thoughts: “First of all, when I would go outside and I was in that environment with other people, I felt like an alien. I felt so different from everyone around me. I felt like I didn't exist in the world. [I would wonder] how long could I continue fighting it? Then I used to think: I can't do this anymore.”

Nandini explained how the verbal harassment he experiences increases his sense of vulnerability due to security risks:

If I stay in one apartment for a long period of time, it becomes clear that people around me are keeping track of my movements. They start to recognize me, I become a topic of discussion and they realize that I'm like this. Or sometimes I'm walking down the street and there's a large group of young men and one of them says, “look they're coming,” that means they were talking about me. I feel scared when that happens because what if something comes of the fact that they're keeping tabs on me? That's why I change apartments frequently. I don't stay in one apartment for longer than 6 months. I've accepted that this is my burden.

The Need for Legal Reform

Transgender men in Bangladesh are currently unable to change their gender on any legal documents due to the government’s failure to establish a mechanism for legal gender recognition.

While the government has taken steps to legally recognize hijras as a third gender category, an important positive development, it has so far done nothing to extend protections to transgender individuals who are not hijras. In January 2014 the Bangladesh cabinet announced in its gazette a policy decision “recogniz[ing] the Hijra community of Bangladesh as a Hijra sex.” The circular marked a significant step toward securing a range of human rights for hijras in Bangladesh, though implementation of the decision has been plagued by lack of clarity about who qualifies as hijra and abuses in implementation of the policy.

The perception of hijras and trans men within Bangladeshi society is vastly different. Hijra is an identity category that predates colonialism and carries a unique socio-cultural significance. As a result, hijras constitute an identity category that is completely separate from that of trans men. Legal protections afforded to hijras do not apply to trans men, who do not have any legal protections.  

In the absence of any mechanism for legal gender recognition, transgender men in Bangladesh are currently unable to change their gender on any legal documents. The lack of any legal recognition mechanism compounds the isolation and insecurity trans men feel.

Omar said: “I believe that if the law is changed, then thousands of trans men will come forward. Even those who don't have the courage to express themselves right now.” For Jamal, a change in the law would be extremely meaningful: “The government should at least recognize us and pass laws to send the message: ‘Ok, you can change your identity, you can change your degrees, we will accept you.’ If we could get assurance that after transitioning, we could change our gender on our diplomas, that you will be accepted as you are, if we could achieve that, then I wouldn't have to worry about leaving the country.”

Same-sex sexual behavior, dubbed “carnal intercourse against the order of nature,” is criminalized in Bangladesh under section 377 of the country’s colonial-era penal code. This law affects transgender men who are attracted to women, and whose male gender is not recognized by the state.

The Constitution of Bangladesh protects the right to equality and non-discrimination and expressly protects against discrimination only on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. It also allows the State to make special provision for the ‘advancement of any backward section of citizens’. Currently, allegations of discrimination can only be enforced against the State, which precludes private actors.

The government should ensure that transgender individuals are not discriminated against on the basis of their gender identity by ensuring the passage of the Anti Discrimination Law, with the inclusion of gender identity and sexual orientation as a basis for non-discrimination. The law was drafted in 2014 with the input of various NGOs and submitted to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. The Ministry has yet to move the proposed legislation forward to begin the process of enacting the law.

Abed explained the importance of legislation protecting against discrimination: “We should be allowed to dress how we want. Gender expression should not be a barrier to employment. For us, expressing our gender through our clothes is as necessary as drinking water.”

Background: The Machete Attacks, Shrinking Civil Society, Police Distrust

Freedom of expression is under assault in Bangladesh today. Militant Islamists and other private actors have targeted those seen as promoting secular values and the government continues its crackdown on the political opposition and other critical voices. Authorities have arrested and imprisoned bloggers and satirists, arrested human rights defenders, closed critical media houses, jailed editors, and charged journalists with contempt of court for reporting unfavorably on government actions.

The “machete attacks” from 2013 to 2016 initially targeted bloggers writing publicly about atheist principles and activists who organized rallies against the leaders of hardline Islamist political parties, but later the list of victims expanded to include religious minorities, professors, publishers, and LGBT rights activists.

The government’s initial reaction involved both condemning the killings but also urging those targeted to censor their writing or curtail their activities. In 2013, the authorities prosecuted four bloggers for “offending religious sentiments.” Shortly after the murder of two LGBT rights activists, Xulhaz Mannan and Tonoy Mahbub, in April 2016, the Bangladeshi home minister told reporters: “As far as we know, Xulhaz was the editor of a magazine named Rupban. And he worked to promote gay rights. This does not fit in our society.” The government’s failure to defend freedom of expression of minority groups has only exacerbated a climate of fear that trans men told Human Rights Watch made them feel they could be next.

Religious minority groups were also targeted during the spate of killings. Attackers planted bombs during religious gatherings and individuals, and the secretary general of an interfaith platform of religious minorities and two pastors were targeted in late 2015. In October 2016, Hindu shrines, temples, and homes were attacked during the Hindu festival of Diwali. The government responded by arresting several hundred suspects, but some sporadic attacks against the Hindu community continued.

Nandini explained to Human Rights Watch the particular risks he faces as a Hindu trans man: “When Hindu minority communities are attacked, I face a dangerous security situation. And because I’m LGBT, when that community faces problems, I’ll also face issues.” Nandini explained the climate of fear facing religious minorities after the July 1, 2016 Dhaka attack at an upscale restaurant where 21 hostages were killed: “Even when I would ride buses after this incident, I noticed I wouldn't see any Hindus wearing anything that could easily identify them as Hindu. When new incidents occurred, and terrorists were arrested, as these incidents increased, so did our fear.”

This climate of impunity has reaffirmed skepticism of the efficacy of police. When speaking to Human Rights Watch, Jamal described his reluctance to report a stalker to the police, even though the stalker knew Jamal’s gender identity and knew that he had a girlfriend: “If this were a different country, I could go to the police and get a restraining order, but here, I can't go to the police. Because if I file a complaint that he's following me, the police might investigate further and find out about my relationship or my gender identity and what if that information then falls into the hands of an extremist group? We don't even have the option to seek legal recourse.”

NGOs are also facing increased scrutiny and restrictions. A 2016 law formalized restrictions on receiving foreign funds without the approval of the NGO Affairs Bureau. Human rights groups face constant obstacles, including escalating harassment and surveillance by police. Omar, who has worked closely with an LGBT organization for several years in an unofficial capacity, explained to Human Rights Watch the barriers the group faces in advocating for legal reform: “They're working on it, but slowly. Because they also have to worry about their safety. They're scared to push too hard.” 

Prior to the murder of the two LGBT activists, LGBT people in Bangladesh had been targeted with extremist rhetoric. For example, in November 2015, when activists began publishing a cartoon series featuring a lesbian character, religious groups issued anti-LGBT statements, calling on the government to prosecute LGBT people under section 377 and Sharia (Islamic Law).

On June 29, 2017, a television special featuring a gay character aired on a major TV channel. The TV special was titled Rainbow and featured a gay character whose brother challenges the homophobic opinions expressed by another character. The special received intense backlash. Critics targeted the TV channel and the corporate sponsor, Grameen phone, expressing their discontent on their respective Facebook pages; others complained through Grameen phone’s customer service hotline.

In response, RTV removed the special from its YouTube channel and Grameen phone issued a statement explaining that it had no prior knowledge of the show’s content. The general secretary of Hefazat-e Islam, Maulana Islamabadi, demanded that those involved in the production of Rainbow issue a formal apology and called for mass protests and a cancellation of RTV’s TV license if they failed to do so. The call for protests carried important implications—in April 2017, when Hefazat led protests against the presence of a statue of Lady Justice outside the Supreme Court, the statue was removed and then relocated. For many, these incidents reflect the growing power of Hefazat and other hardline Islamist political parties.

In this climate, trans men who spoke to Human Rights Watch not surprisingly spoke of their fear of Islamist hardliners. For example, Abed said: “Religious leaders need to understand that Allah made us this way. If they don't understand this, then we'll face a lot of harm. They might do something to us otherwise. We don't have security.”

Dear Prime Minister Hasina,

We write to request you to take urgent steps to confirm the whereabouts and seek the release of the men currently detained by Bangladesh law enforcement or intelligence agencies outside the authority of the courts. We urge you to also take all possible steps to bring the current practice of secret detentions and enforced disappearances to an end, which is now affecting hundreds of Bangladeshi families.

Human Rights Watch is an international non-government organization working on a range of human rights issues in over 90 countries worldwide. We have been following and reporting on Bangladesh for over two decades. We accept no funding from any government or political entity to ensure our independence.

Enforced disappearances have emerged as a key and pressing concern in Bangladesh. Human Rights Watch has reported extensively on the issue. We have frequently raised our concerns in meetings with senior government officials over many years. In the 2013 Universal Periodic Review, the Bangladesh government agreed to “thoroughly and impartially investigate and … prosecute all allegations of human rights violations, in particular enforced disappearances, custodial torture and extra-judicial killings,” including violations by members of the security forces. However, except for a few isolated incidents, the government has failed to honor this commitment.

According to data collated by journalists and Bangladeshi human rights groups, hundreds remain victims of enforced disappearance, even as the authorities ignore appeals from family members and even threaten them for speaking out. Over 80 cases of disappearances were reported in 2017, with seven later reported killed and 17 still missing. It is suspected that there are many other cases which have not been reported.

In July 2017, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting a number of enforced disappearances since 2013, including at least 90 victims in 2016. While most were produced in court after weeks or months of secret detention, Human Rights Watch documented 21 cases of detainees who were later killed in so-called gunfights or “crossfire,” and nine others whose whereabouts remain unknown.

During Human Rights Watch investigations into disappearances, witnesses confirmed the involvement of law enforcement agencies; including the police, the Detective Branch of the police, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). Some of these disappearances appear to be politically motivated with several members of opposition parties or their relatives still missing, including Sajedul Islam Sumon, Adnan Chowdhury, Mir Ahmed Bin Qasem, and Abdullahil Amaan Azmi. Salauddin Ahmed, spokesperson and joint-secretary of the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP), was disappeared for three months and later found in India. Hummam Qader Chowdhury, the son of a senior BNP leader, SQ Chowdhury, was released after six months of secret detention with no government explanation or compensation.

In the vast majority of cases of enforced disappearance, police refuse to allow the families to file a criminal complaint against state agencies, at most only permitting them to file a ‘missing person’ complaint. In addition, Bangladesh authorities, at the highest levels, have chosen to dismiss or deny the allegations instead of investigating these cases and helping family members. You have said that while the government of Bangladesh has an obligation to protect its citizens, other countries such as the UK and US have larger numbers of disappearances, conflating enforced disappearances by Bangladeshi authorities with disappearances for other reasons in the UK and US. The Home Minister has attempted to dismiss the problem by stating that people have faked their disappearances for personal reasons, such as debts or crimes, or to embarrass the government. Even if this turns out to be true in some cases, it is an abdication of responsibility to take no action in the large number of cases of genuine disappearances.

We are concerned that ahead of upcoming national elections there may again be a spike in politically motivated disappearances, as happened at the time of the 2014 polls.

With denial and impunity the norm, an independent investigation is necessary. Human Rights Watch recommends that the government invite such an investigation during the upcoming visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. We further recommend that the government invite relevant UN special procedures—including the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the working group on arbitrary detentions; and the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—to visit Bangladesh to investigate and make appropriate recommendations to ensure justice and accountability, as well as reform of the security forces so that they will act independently and professionally. We note that although the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances has repeatedly requested an invitation to visit Bangladesh, it has received no response.

We also urge Bangladesh to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

We request specific information about the disappeared individuals, contained in the appendix to this letter, who were picked up in the last two years by state agencies and remain missing. Please contact my colleague Shayna Bauchner at bauchns@hrw.org or via fax at +1-292-612-4333 with any questions or information.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Brad Adams
Asia Director
Human Rights Watch

CC: 

The Honourable Anisul Haq
Minister of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs

The Honourable Mahbubey Alam
Attorney General
Supreme Court of Bangladesh

Mr. Asaduzzaman Khan
Minister of Home Affairs

Mr. Didar Ahmed
Detective Branch Additional Commissioner

Mr. Benazir Ahmed
Director General
Rapid Action Battalion

Major General Md Saiful Abedin
Director General
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence

Brigadier General SM Matiur Rahman
Director, Counter-terrorism and Intelligence Bureau
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence

Mr. Hussain Muhammad Ershad
Special Envoy to the Prime Minister

Mr. Houssain Toufique Imam
Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Political Affairs

Major General Tarique Ahmed Siddique
Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Security Affairs

Appendix: List of those disappeared since January 2016, provided by Bangladesh human rights activists

Maroof Zaman
Maroof Zaman, a former Bangladeshi ambassador to Qatar and Vietnam, disappeared on December 4, 2017, when he drove to Dhaka airport to pick up his daughter. Subsequently, masked men entered the family house and took away his computer and other devices.

Robiul Islam
Two men, identifying themselves as members of RAB, detained Robiul Islam, an alleged one-time drug dealer who at the time of his disappearance worked for the NGO "Robir Alo," saying that they wanted him to provide information. He remains disappeared since October 25, 2017.

Sohel Khan
Sohel Khan, general secretary of the youth wing of Awami League’s Chingrakhali union in Bagherat, disappeared after he was allegedly detained by RAB on July 17, 2017.

Abdullah Al Faruq
Abdullah Al Faruq, a student activist of the Awami League, disappeared after he was detained in Rajshahi on July 18, 2017, by men who identified themselves as members of RAB. RAB has denied their role.

Mohammad Siddiqur Rahman Nahid
Mohammad Siddiqur Rahman Nahid, assistant general secretary of Narsingdi Government College unit of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, disappeared after he was detained on June 9, 2017, by about 10 men identifying themselves as law enforcement officers.

Rizwan Haroon
Lakehead Grammar School co-founder Rizwan Haroon disappeared from Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport on May 10, 2017, upon his arrival from the United Kingdom on an Emirates Airways flight. According to news reports, intelligence agencies suspected him of being linked to terrorism.

Emon Hossain
Emon Hossain was one of seven men picked up between May 4 and 6, 2017 from two villages in Jhenaidah district apparently by law enforcement authorities. While the other six were formally shown arrested in subsequent months after a period of secret detention, Emon Hossain remains disappeared.

Abdul Kuddus Pramanik
Md. Abdul Kuddus Pramanik, a farmer, disappeared after he was detained in Rajshahi on March 30, 2017, by a group of men who introduced themselves as law enforcement officers.

Shafikur Rahman, Mohammad Hasan, and Moazzam Hossain Sathi
Shafikur Rahman, 35, and his brothers-in-law Mohammad Hasan, 21, and Moazzem Hossain Sathi, 18, disappeared in Chittagong on March 24, 2017. Rahman’s wife told journalists that a day after his detention, he called relatives from his cell phone to say that a team of law enforcement officials had picked them up and tortured them.  

Imrul Hossain, Ibrahim Gazi, Rezaul Islam, Alam Khan
Six men from different villages in the Sadar and Kotchandpur areas of Jhenaidah district were detained over a two-week period in March 2017. One man, Humanyan Kabir, was later released, and another, Anarul Islam, was arrested, but the other four men remain disappeared.

Shafiqul Islam Modhu
Shafiqul Islam Modhu, an employee of Rangpur Karuponno Garment Company, disappeared after he was detained in Rangpur on January 13, 2017, by law enforcement officers in front of his family members.

Hassan Ali
Hassan Ali, who worked as a salesman for a clothes shop, disappeared after he was picked up in Dhaka on January 7, 2017, by plainclothes officers, one of whom was identified in CCTV footage as being from the police Detective Branch.

Abdullahil Amaan Azmi
According to his relatives and an eyewitness, Abdulahali Amaan Azmi, a former army officer, disappeared after he was detained on August 22, 2016, by security forces from his home in Mogh Bazaar in Dhaka. Azmi is the son of Ghulam Azam, a Jamaat-e-Islami leader, who died in custody in 2014 after he was sentenced to 90 years in prison for crimes against humanity during the country's 1971 independence war. 

Mir Ahmed Bin Quasem
Mir Ahmed bin Quasem disappeared after he was detained on August 9, 2016 from his home in Mirpur in Dhaka. His wife, sister, and two young children witnessed his detention by law enforcement officers. Ahmed is the son of Mir Quasem Ali, a Jamaat-e-Islami leader who was executed on September 4, 2016, following his conviction for crimes committed during the country's independence war.

Yasin Mohammad Abdus Samad Talukdar
Yasin Mohammad Abdus Samad Talukdar, a British national, disappeared on July 14, 2016. Witnesses said he had been detained by members of RAB in Banani, Dhaka.  Both the police and RAB deny having him in custody.

Kamrul Islam Sikdar Musa
Kamrul Islam Sikdar Musa, suspected in the June 5, 2016, killing of the wife of a senior police officer, is still on the run according to the authorities. However, Sikdar’s wife claims that he has disappeared after he was arrested in Chittagong on June 22, 2016, by a group of plainclothes policemen.

Bibhas Sangma, Rajesh Marak and Probhat Marak
Bibhas Sangma, a college student, was detained by law enforcement officials, some of them wearing RAB uniforms, on April 14, 2016.  He was picked up along with his relatives Probhat Marak, a labourer, and Rajesh Marak, a student. All three, who are members of an indigenous community, have disappeared.

Sheikh Mohammad Moyajjem Hossain Tapu
A student leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mohammad Moyajjem Hossain Tapu, disappeared after being detained on January 26, 2016, in Dhaka. His relatives said that according to a witness he was detained by three men who said they were members of the Detective Branch of the police. 

We write in advance of your upcoming review of Bangladesh’s compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 

Human Rights Watch has extensively documented human rights violations in Bangladesh relating to neglect in the government’s response to arsenic contamination of drinking water, and exposure of workers and residents to untreated chemical effluent from the Hazaribagh leather tanneries in Dhaka. Human Rights Watch has also documented rights abuses adversely affecting Bangladeshi garment workers as well as migrant domestic workers. Child marriage as well as discriminatory personal laws hamper women’s and girls’ health and lives. Additionally, we wish to highlight the importance of adequate access to sexual and reproductive health care for ethnic Rohingya women and girls, access to education for refugee Rohingya children in Bangladesh, and encourage Bangladesh to endorse the Safe Schools Declaration.

Environmental Health

(Article 12)

Arsenic Contamination

Arsenic occurs naturally in Bangladesh’s groundwater and contaminates the drinking water of many millions of Bangladesh’s rural poor. Bangladesh has failed to address this decades-long problem. An estimated 20 million people in Bangladesh still drink water contaminated over the national standard. Our April 2016 report Nepotism and Neglect: The Failing Response to Arsenic in the Drinking Water of Bangladesh’s Rural Poor documents how Bangladesh’s health system largely ignores the impact of exposure to arsenic on people’s health. In response to our report, the national minister of local government told the media that no one in Bangladesh currently suffers from arsenic poisoning.

According to a 2012 World Health Organization (WHO) study, 43,000 people die each year from arsenic-related illness in Bangladesh. The same study estimates that depending on the progress of ending arsenic exposure, between one to five million children estimated to be born between 2000 and 2030 will eventually die of diseases caused by exposure to arsenic in drinking water.[1] The government identifies people with arsenic-related illnesses primarily via skin lesions, although the vast majority of those with arsenic-related illnesses do not develop such lesions. Those exposed are at significant risk of cancer, cardiovascular disease, and lung disease, but many receive no health care at all.[2]

Government wells are vitally important in arsenic-affected areas of Bangladesh: deeper wells drilled down approximately 150 meters into the ground often supply water without arsenic. They can provide drinking water for hundreds of people. Deep government wells are a potentially life-saving public good, but they are too expensive for most families in rural villages in Bangladesh to install by themselves. However, some politicians are diverting these life-saving public goods to their political supporters and allies. Such political diversion is enabled by national policy: at the end of a long explanation of who, ideally, should get the water, a government policy states: “50% of the sites for allocation [of new wells] should be finalised after discussion with the relevant member of parliament of that area.”[3]

In February 2017, three United Nations special rapporteurs published a joint letter raising the concerns that they had sent to the government the previous year, but the government has yet to respond.[4]

Human Rights Watch recommends the Committee ask the government of Bangladesh:

• Do any government projects for the installation of government wells have an official policy enabling political representatives (members of parliament, upazila (sub-district) chairmen, or others) to influence the locations of government water points? If so, what is the justification for such policies?
• What steps, if any, have been taken to implement the provisions of the government’s 2005 “pro-poor policy for the water and sanitation sector” in a way that avoids political representatives (members of parliament, upazila chairmen or others) rewarding political allies or political supporters with government water points?
• What steps, if any, does the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare take to ensure that people who do not manifest skin lesions, but who have other arsenic-related health conditions, are included in the calculation of “arsenic patients” published in the ministry’s annual Health Bulletin?
• How has the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare integrated possible arsenic exposure into other screening and treatment protocols, including but not limited to cancers (of the skin, liver, kidney, bladder, and lungs), cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, diabetes, and hypertension?

Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government of Bangladesh to:

• End any official or de facto policy or practice whereby political representatives (members of parliament, upazila (sub-district) chairmen, or others) influence the locations of government water points;
• Immediately prioritize a dedicated and comprehensive arsenic mitigation project specific to all administrative unions already identified as “very high” and “high” priorities for action. Include measurable and time-bound goals to reduce exposure in these areas, with independent third-party quality control to assess results of the project;
• Initially for district hospitals and upazila-level healthcare centers covering administrative unions identified as “very high” and “high” priorities for action, and then in other areas of the country, develop and implement improved surveillance, treatment, and care programs for chronic diseases known to be caused by arsenic, including but not limited to cancers, cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, diabetes, and hypertension.

Occupational and Environmental Health

(Articles 7, 10, 12)

Hazaribagh Leather Tanneries

The government of Bangladesh has consistently failed to enforce labor or environmental laws in Hazaribagh, a residential area of Dhaka that is also home to a cluster of some 150 leather tanneries, and thus failed to protect the right to health of workers and residents. In our October 2012 report Toxic Tanneries: The Health Repercussions of Bangladesh’s Hazaribagh Leather, Human Rights Watch documented the occupational health and safety crisis among tannery workers, both men and women, including skin diseases and respiratory illnesses caused by exposure to tanning chemicals, and limb amputations caused by accidents in dangerous tannery machinery.[5]

Human Rights Watch interviewed children, some as young as 11, who worked in tanneries. They were engaged in hazardous work, such as soaking hides in chemicals, cutting tanned hides with razorblades, and operating dangerous tanning machinery.[6]

Residents of Hazaribagh slums reported illnesses such as fevers, skin diseases, respiratory problems, and diarrhea, caused by the extreme tannery pollution of air, water, and soil. The tanneries produce environmentally hazardous waste containing chemicals such as sulfur, ammonium, and chromium.[7]

Hazaribagh tanneries operate in an enforcement-free zone in which they are subject to little or no government oversight with regard to environmental regulations or labor laws, as government officials readily admit. As a result of this inaction—which is due to a de facto policy not to implement environmental laws in Hazaribagh, and a labor inspectorate that lacks manpower and prioritizes good relations with management—workers and local residents continue to reside and labor in a noxious, foul-smelling environment that damages their health.[8]

In 2017, the government began to relocate about a third of the approximately 150 tanneries out of Hazaribagh, to a dedicated industrial zone in Savar just outside of Dhaka. However, many continue to operate in Hazaribagh, in contravention of multiple High Court orders, most recently in March 2017. In November 2017, the government announced that the move to Savar had been delayed again and would not be completed until 2019.[9] The extent of enforcement of labor and environmental laws in the leather tanning cluster in Savar is unknown.

Human Rights Watch recommends the Committee ask the government of Bangladesh:

• Provide details on the total number of Hazaribagh tanneries visited by inspectors from the Department of Inspection for Factories and Establishments, including any Hazaribagh tanneries charged by the department before the Labour Courts regarding infringements of the Labour Act (2006). If no Hazaribagh tanneries have been charged by the department before the Labour Courts regarding infringements of the Labour Act, please specify why not.
• Does the government of Bangladesh have, in law or in fact, a policy to not enforce environmental laws or regulations against any Hazaribagh tannery? If so, please explain the date this policy was adopted, the precise terms of this policy, and the rationale for this policy. Please also explain the legal grounds that permit the government to adopt such a policy.

Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government of Bangladesh to:

• Take immediate and sustained action to enforce compliance by all tanneries in Hazaribagh and Savar with the Labour Act, including the provisions on worker health and safety; all paid leave including sick leave; compensation for injuries (including occupational diseases); and effective disposal of waste and effluent;
• Order all remaining Hazaribagh tanneries to immediately begin relocating outside Dhaka city;
• In accordance with Bangladesh’s Environmental Conservation Act (1995) and Environment Conservation Rules (1997), ensure that all tanneries (including relocated ones) have an environmental clearance certificate for industrial units categorized as “red” (i.e. heavily polluting) from the Department of Environment, or close them down.

Protecting Students, Teachers, and Schools

(Article 13)

In the days preceding the January 2014 election, unknown assailants torched dozens of schools intended to be used as polling stations in Bangladesh. Government ministers said that 553 schools and educational institutions were damaged during this election-related violence.[10]

A 2012 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs report on the human rights situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts documented the destruction of a school by the Bangladeshi army, the burning of schools by armed settlers, and the expropriation by the army of a school built by the international organization World Vision.[11]

Human Rights Watch encourages Bangladesh to endorse the Safe Schools Declaration, an international commitment to better protect students, educational staff, schools, and universities during armed conflict.[12] It was drafted through a consultative process led by Norway and Argentina in 2015. The Declaration includes a commitment to use the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict.[13] As of February 8, 2018, 72 countries—representing more than one-third of all UN member states—have already endorsed the Safe Schools Declaration.

It is of particular importance that Bangladesh endorses the Declaration as the country currently contributes the second highest number of personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations, with over 7,000 troops.[14] Bangladeshi troops who partake in UN Peacekeeping Operations are obligated to not use schools in their operations.[15]

Bangladesh also has two laws that should regulate schools and universities from being interfered with by security forces. Under the “Manoeuvres, Field Firing and Artillery Practice Act,” military forces are not authorized to “pass over, or encamp, construct military works of a temporary character, or execute military Manoeuvres” that enter or interfere with any educational institution.[16] Moreover, under the “Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance,” educational institutions may not be requisitioned even for a public purpose or in the public interest, “save in the case of emergency requirement for the purpose of maintenance of transport or communication system.”[17]

Human Rights Watch recommends the Committee ask the government of Bangladesh:

• What action has the government taken to prevent attacks on schools and universities and to mitigate their impact when they do occur?
• What concrete measures has the government taken to deter military use of schools, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2225 of 2015?
• Is the ban on the use of schools by UN peacekeepers contained in pre-deployment trainings provided to Bangladeshi UN peacekeeping forces?

Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government of Bangladesh to:

• Investigate, appropriately prosecute, and punish individuals found guilty for attacks on schools, and where appropriate, provide remedial measures for violations;
• Take concrete measures to protect education from attack and deter the military use of schools, following UN Security Council Resolutions 2143 (2014) and 2225 (2015), including by endorsing the Safe Schools Declaration, thereby committing to use the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use in Armed Conflict.

Access to Sexual and Reproductive Health Care for Rohingya Women and Girls and Education for Rohingya Refugee Children

(Articles 12, 13)

Since late August 2017, Bangladesh has received an influx of over 655,000 Rohingya refugees from across the border with Myanmar. As Bangladesh struggles to assist this population, it is important that it provides and protects basic human rights, facilitates access to international humanitarian agencies, and complies with international refugee protection standards.[18]

Human Rights Watch, and others, including the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, have documented widespread gang rape and other sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, during the Myanmar military’s ethnic cleansing campaign that began in August 2017.[19] However, Rohingya women and girls, who are often denied access to all forms of sexual and reproductive health care in Myanmar because of discriminate state policies and practices, still face significant barriers in the Bangladesh refugee camps.

A joint response plan for universal education for Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh has recently been developed with key stakeholders and in consultation with the Government of Bangladesh. According to UNICEF, an estimated 625,000 Rohingya refugee children and youth are in need of education assistance.[20] Each of these children has a right to free and universal education and the denial of this right will have serious consequences for the children, their families, as well as the futures of both Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government of Bangladesh to:

• Ensure access to sexual and reproductive health care, and, with the support of international donors, ensure refugee women and girls have adequate access to post-rape care, protection services and a full range of birth control options;
• Ensure, with the support of international donors, that supplies are adequate and that key contraception commodities are stocked regularly so that they do not run out;
• Lift obstacles to the provision of humanitarian services, including slow approval of new agencies’ registration and new projects by agencies already on the ground;
• Lift any requirements that patients have a permanent address in Bangladesh before receiving long-acting reversible contraceptives;
• Provide, with the support of international donors, free quality and inclusive education to all Rohingya refugee children without discrimination.

Workers’ Rights

(Articles 6, 7, 8)

Garment Industry

The garment industry accounts for almost 80 percent of the Bangladesh’s export earnings and contributes to more than 10 percent of the gross domestic product, employing more than four million workers, the majority of them women. In recent years, two major disasters have taken the lives of people working in Tazreen factory and garment factories housed in the Rana Plaza building.[21][22] 

Overall, garment workers face poor working conditions and anti-union tactics by employers including assaults on union organizers. Human Rights Watch’s April 2015 report “Whoever Raises Their Head, Suffers the Most”: Workers’ Rights in Bangladesh’s Garment Factories documented violations including physical assault, verbal abuse–sometimes of a sexual nature–forced overtime, denial of paid maternity leave, and failure to pay wages and bonuses on time or in full. Despite repeated calls to reform labor laws, including those governing workers in Special Economic Zones, and to bring these laws in conformance with key international standards, the government has yet to make any reforms. Threats, intimidation, dismissal, and sometimes physical assault against union representatives by factory management or hired third parties remains a pressing problem that significantly hampers workers ability to collectively negotiate better working conditions. The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety and the Bangladesh Alliance on Worker Safety, initiatives on fire and building safety that were developed after the collapse of the Rana Plaza, have over the past several years, terminated factories from participating in these initiatives where they repeatedly refused to take corrective action to make the factories safe for workers. The Bangladeshi government has yet to report any action taken on these factories and publish how many have been shut down or whose licenses have been canceled because they are unsafe.[23]

Factory officials are generally not held accountable for attacks, threats, and retaliation against workers, particularly those involved with unions. In response to protests in December 2016 by garment workers seeking higher wages, factory owners dismissed over 1,500 workers and authorities detained 38 union leaders and workers on unsubstantiated criminal charges.[24]

Human Rights Watch recommends the Committee ask the government of Bangladesh:

• What steps has the government taken to respond to workers’ grievances and begin a process of transparent and participatory review of worker wages?
• What steps has the Bangladesh government taken to expedite amending its labor laws to bring them in line with international core labor standards and human rights and ensure that workers’ right to work is not subverted?
• What steps has the Bangladesh government taken to shut down or remediate factories that have been terminated from the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety or the Bangladesh Alliance on Worker Safety and to periodically report progress on these actions in a transparent manner?
• How many garment factories have set up anti-sexual harassment complaints committees in accordance with the Bangladesh High Court guidelines to prevent and respond to workplace sexual harassment, and what steps is the government taking to monitor them?

​Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government of Bangladesh to:

• Immediately and periodically publish the steps taken by the Bangladesh government to hold accountable factories that have been blacklisted and removed from the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety and the Bangladesh Alliance on Worker Safety for failing to take corrective steps to make the premises safe;
• Pass comprehensive legislation governing sexual harassment at the workplace and in the interim strictly monitor implementation of High Court guidelines governing sexual harassment;
• Revise national labor laws to fully comply with the standards of International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining;
• Initiate a transparent and participatory wage review process in consultation with independent unions and labor advocates.

Migrant Domestic Workers

Over 100,000 Bangladeshi women migrated abroad for work, mostly to the Middle East in 2017.[25] Most of these women are recruited for domestic work.

Human Rights Watch is concerned about the lack of oversight and monitoring of recruitment agencies and labor brokers; investigation and prosecution of trafficking of forced labor and other forms; provision of adequate training and information of workers’ rights before departure; as well as a lack of assistance to Bangladeshi migrant workers who find themselves abused and trapped in Gulf States. 

The Bangladeshi government has actively sought to increase the recruitment of migrant domestic workers in the Gulf states, but has not instituted adequate oversight and protection mechanisms. Many of the Gulf states provide little to no labor law protection for domestic workers, and operate a visa-sponsorship system, known as kafala, which ties migrant domestic workers to their employers, and punishes them with imprisonment, fines, or deportation if they “run-away” or “abscond.”[26]

Human Rights Watch found many cases of Bangladeshi domestic workers in Oman who experienced a range of abuses, including passport confiscation, non-payment of wages, lack of rest periods and time off, confinement to households, excessive work and working hours, food deprivation, and psychological, physical, and sexual abuse. Bangladeshi workers’ accounts of abuse were among the most extreme Human Rights Watch documented in Oman, including cases amounting to forced labor and trafficking. Several women said that recruitment agencies and local brokers in Bangladesh deceived them about work, pay, and conditions, and charged them fees.[27]

Most Middle East governments prohibit recruiters from charging migrant workers recruitment fees, but Bangladesh allows licensed recruiters to charge women migrant worker recruits up to 20,000 BDT (US$260). But some Bangladeshi women who spoke to Human Rights Watch in Oman said they had paid recruiters up to 100,000 Bangladeshi taka (US$1,270) for work abroad. An ILO study found that domestic workers are recruited through a chain of sub-agents that connect to recruitment agencies in the capital.[28] Recruitment fees combined with loans with high interest rates, as well as low or unpaid salaries, can trap workers in exploitative situations, as workers feel bound to stay to recoup their money and pay any debt.[29]

Human Rights Watch also found that Bangladeshi embassies in the Gulf states either provided no shelter or informal shelter with very little capacity for domestic workers who fled from abuse. Many Bangladeshi women are left stranded as undocumented workers are liable to arrest and deportation, or vulnerable to other abuse such as sexual exploitation.[30]  

Other than Kuwait’s minimum monthly salary of 60 Kuwaiti dinars (US$200) for domestic workers, no other Middle Eastern country sets minimum salaries for such workers. The embassies of other countries of origin require employers to agree to monthly minimum salaries; Bangladesh has one of the lowest at about US$200. Recruitment agencies in turn often advertise domestic workers with differing salaries based on nationalities, rather than on skills and experience, to employers, resulting in discrimination on the basis of nationality.[31]

While Bangladesh has set a minimum salary and requires employers to sign an undertaking at its embassy, it has not adopted any protection mechanisms that could ensure that employers abide by such requirements. For instance, Nepali embassies in the Gulf require that employers and agencies provide a refundable security deposit, which can be used to pay for flight tickets or unpaid salaries if workers flee to them. Philippine embassies institute a blacklisting mechanism with agencies and require employers or agents to pay for return flight tickets home if workers flee to them.[32]

Human Rights Watch recommends the Committee ask the government of Bangladesh:

• What steps has the Bangladeshi government taken to monitor recruitment agencies and local brokers? Are local brokers required to register with recruitment agencies? Does Bangladesh conduct unannounced inspections of recruitment agencies?  
• What measures are in place for Bangladeshi women workers who have returned to file complaints against recruitment agencies and local brokers?     
• How many investigations have been conducted and how many led to successful prosecutions of recruitment agencies and local brokers involved in trafficking or forced labor of Bangladeshi workers abroad? 
• Are there any policies in place to ensure that migrant domestic workers who have fled to a Bangladeshi embassy are provided with shelter, legal assistance, medical and psycho-social care or interpreters? 

Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government of Bangladesh to:

• Ratify the ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011, and the ILO Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930;
• Ensure that regulations concerning recruitment agencies and their practices meet standards established in the ILO Domestic Workers Convention, monitor recruitment rigorously, and impose meaningful penalties for violations;
• Create procedures for domestic workers to register allegations of deception, overcharging, and abuse by agents at foreign missions and upon return. Bangladeshi missions and government should investigate and sanction sub-agents and recruiters for abuse;
• Enhance the capacity of Bangladeshi missions in host countries to assist migrant domestic workers by establishing shelter facilities, ensuring that the Bangladeshi missions in host states have a 24-hour assistance hotline and/or is staffed 24 hours per day to assist domestic workers fleeing abusive workplaces, and arranging legal representation when not provided by the host government;
• Create mechanisms to enforce minimum salaries and other benefits.

Marriage Rights

(Articles 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13)

Child Marriage

The prevalence of child marriage has devastating consequences for individual girls, their families, and Bangladesh’s development as a whole. Bangladesh has the highest rate of child marriage in Asia and the fourth highest in the world.[33] Poverty is one of the main factors driving the high rate of child marriage. Climate change and natural disasters are other significant drivers for child marriage.[34]

In 2014, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina pledged to end child marriage under age 15 by 2021 and to end child marriage under age 18 by 2041. However, in February 2017, the government greatly undermined progress toward these goals by approving a law that permits girls under age 18 to marry under "special circumstances," such as "accidental" or "illegal pregnancy," with permission from their parents and a court. There is no age limit to how early girls can marry under this exception.[35]

In our 2015 report “Marry Before Your House is Swept Away”: Child Marriage in Bangladesh, Human Rights found that girls in Bangladesh almost always dropped out of school once they were married. They became pregnant early, either because they were pressured to or felt that they should, or because they had no access to contraception and information about family planning. Many girls and their babies suffered health problems as a result of early pregnancy, and many suffered violence and abuse in their homes. Even when girls separated from their husbands or got divorced early, economic and social pressures often kept them from resuming their studies.[36]

Human Rights Watch recommends the Committee ask the government:

• What is the current status of the national action plan to end child marriage that was announced by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2014?
• Has the government prepared regulations to clarify and narrow the “special circumstances” under which children can marry under the 2017 law, and put in place protections for children who marry under the law?

Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government to:

• Repeal the provision of the Child Marriage Restraint Bill that permits marriage before age 18. Failing this, the government should draft regulations setting out narrow parameters for when such marriages can be permitted, establishing safeguards to minimize abuse, and providing on-going services to children married under this provision;
• Promptly finalize and implement its long-promised national action plan to end child marriage, in consultation with survivors of child marriage and youth and civil society organizations;
• Continue expansion of birth and marriage registration and establish measures to ensure that all births and marriages are registered and this process is used to detect and prevent child marriages;
• Take administrative or criminal action to end corruption of local officials who take bribes to provide false birth certificates in order to facilitate child marriages;
• Government agencies providing assistance to families in poverty or affected by disasters should be more directly involved in preventing child marriage;
• Follow through on the government’s goals set to end child marriage under 15 by 2021 and child marriage under 18 by 2041 and target 5.3 under the Sustainable Development Goals of ending all child marriage by 2030.

Discriminatory Personal Laws

Bangladesh’s discriminatory personal laws often trap women in abusive marriages or propel many of them into poverty when marriages fall apart. Our September 2012 report “Will I Get My Dues … Before I Die?”:Harm to Women from Bangladesh’s Discriminatory Laws on Marriage and Divorce documented that especially for poor women, discriminatory personal laws contribute to homelessness, hunger, and ill health for those divorced or separated and their dependents.[37]

Bangladesh has no legal regime governing marital property. Neither civil nor personal laws define or set out rules for control over marital property during marriage or the division of marital property on an equal basis between spouses upon divorce. Many women and lawyers told Human Rights Watch that after years of contributing to their households, women were forced to leave their marital homes with nothing more than personal jewellery or small household items. Family court proceedings are hugely delayed, and even where decrees are passed in favour of women, executing the decrees takes many months and even years.[38]

Bangladesh has a strong law governing domestic violence, which defines “economic violence,” and gives women the right to a matrimonial home and other interim maintenance, which can be used to address some of the problems created by discriminatory personal laws to provide women effective remedies until personal laws are reformed. Similarly, family courts are empowered to grant interim maintenance and also collapse proceedings for maintenance with execution of decrees, which can be used to significantly cut delays in providing economic spousal support to women.[39]

Human Rights Watch recommends the Committee ask the government:

• What steps is the government taking to train the higher and lower judiciary about “economic violence” and to use the law governing domestic violence to provide remedies to women facing discriminatory family laws?
• What steps is the government taking to train and ensure that family courts use their powers to grant interim maintenance to married women with marital disputes?
• What steps is the government taking to ensure that processes governing summons and execution of decrees are reviewed and streamlined to cut delays in court proceedings?

Human Rights Watch asks the Committee to call upon the government to:

• Reform all personal laws to remove discriminatory features; grant equal access to divorce to men and women; remove barriers to securing maintenance; and ensure women’s equal right to marital property during marriage and upon divorce;
• Disseminate information about the protections available in the law against domestic violence in different media, including through methods accessible to people with disabilities, and monitor implementation of the law;
• Review and reform family court proceedings to eliminate delays and ensure that judges grant interim maintenance in eligible cases;
• Strengthen social assistance programs, including access to shelters for poor women, divorced and separated women, and survivors of domestic violence.

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(New York) – The Bangladeshi government should review and reform the proposed Digital Security Act (DSA) instead of enacting the law in its current form, Human Rights Watch said today.

On January 29, 2018, the cabinet approved a draft law, intended to replace the much-criticized Information and Communication Technology Act (ICT). The draft is even broader than the law it seeks to replace and violates the country’s international obligation to protect freedom of speech.

“The proposed law totally undermines the government’s claim that it has no intention of curbing the right to freedom of speech,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “With at least five different provisions criminalizing vaguely defined types of speech, the law is a license for wide-ranging suppression of critical voices.”

After the repeated abuse of section 57 of the ICT Act to prosecute journalists and others for criticizing the prime minister, her family, or her government on social media, Bangladesh authorities committed to repeal the law. Although the proposed new law to replace the ICT Act limits prosecutions for defamation to those that could be prosecuted under the penal code and imposes an intent requirement for certain offenses, it also contains provisions that are even more draconian than those in section 57.

Section 14 of the draft would authorize sentences of up to 14 years in prison for spreading “propaganda and campaign against liberation war of Bangladesh or spirit of the liberation war or Father of the Nation.” The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the independent expert body that monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Bangladesh is a party, has expressly stated that laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical facts are incompatible with a country’s obligations to respect freedom of opinion and expression.

Section 25(a) would permit sentences of up to three years in prison for publishing information which is “aggressive or frightening” – broad terms that are not defined in the proposed statute. The use of such vague terms violates the requirement that laws restricting speech be formulated with sufficient precision to make clear what speech would violate the law. The vagueness of the offense, combined with the harshness of the potential penalty, increases the likelihood of self-censorship to avoid possible prosecution.

Section 31, which would impose sentences of up to ten years in prison for posting information which “ruins communal harmony or creates instability or disorder or disturbs or is about to disturb the law and order situation,” is similarly flawed. With no clear definition of what speech would be considered to “ruin communal harmony” or “create instability,” the law leaves wide scope for the government to use it to prosecute speech it does not like.

Almost any criticism of the government may lead to dissatisfaction and the possibility of public protests. The government should not be able to punish criticism on the grounds that it may “disturb the law and order situation.”

Section 31 also covers speech that “creates animosity, hatred or antipathy among the various classes and communities.” While the goal of preventing inter-communal strife is an important one, it should be done in ways that restrict speech as little as possible. UN human rights experts have stated that:

It is absolutely necessary in a free society that restrictions on public debate or discourse and the protection of racial harmony are not implemented at the detriment of human rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.

The law’s overly broad definition of “hate speech” opens the door for arbitrary and abusive application of the law and creates an unacceptable chill on the discussion of issues relating to race and religion.

Section 29, like section 57 of the ICT Act, criminalizes online defamation. While section 29, unlike the ICT Act, limits defamation charges to those that meet the requirements of the criminal defamation provisions of the penal code, it is nevertheless contrary to a growing recognition that defamation should be considered a civil matter, not a crime punishable with imprisonment.

Section 28 would impose up to five years in prison for speech that “injures religious feelings.” While this provision, unlike section 57 of the ICT, requires intent, that addition is insufficient to bring it into compliance with international norms. As noted in the seminal Handyside case, freedom of expression is applicable not only to information or ideas “that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.” A prohibition on speech that hurts someone’s religious feelings, reinforced by criminal penalties, cannot be justified as a necessary and proportionate restriction on speech.

“The Digital Security Act is utterly inconsistent with Bangladesh’s obligation to protect freedom of speech,” said Adams. “Parliament should reject the bill and insist on a law that truly respects the right of the country’s citizens to speak freely.”

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I have heard this term a lot, most recently when I joined a heated BBC Radio debate on India: whataboutery.

This term does not refer to protesting inconsistencies by making a reasoned argument that presents opposing facts. Rather, whataboutery is used as a much more sinister challenge to human rights: the practice wherein perpetrators of violations, or their supporters, do not deny the abuses, but instead justify them and shout down criticism by citing the wrongdoings of their victims. All too often, they absolve collective punishment through whataboutery.

Human rights defenders often speak for the rights of the unpopular—including those accused of terrorism, murder, or rape—by calling for fair trials and protections from torture or ill treatment. While immediate revulsion to backing the rights of alleged criminals is an understandable emotional response, it is the responsibility of political leaders to uphold human rights and root societies in rule of law.

Instead, whataboutery has become a key part of populist political rhetoric, appealing to ethnicity, race, or religion. These awful justifications appear to be endless, particularly because social media offers a medium to express such views. Even democracies that have long endorsed universal human rights are faltering, whether in the United States, India, Australia, countries throughout Europe, or younger nations such as Bangladesh. Confronting the dilemma of terror attacks, rising crime, and a deluge of refugees is difficult, but instead of upholding human rights principles, too many political and religious leaders are promoting harsh, unrealistic alternatives. Their justifications for repressive countermeasures can cite alleged decades- or even centuries-old wrongdoings by particular groups of people. Meanwhile, majority groups, desperate for reassurance, believe that this sliding commitment to civil liberties is the appropriate response to the wrongs that they are forced to endure.

Read the full article >>

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Even as Myanmar’s response to the Bangladeshi government’s first list of more than 8,000 Rohingya refugees for repatriation in February was to “verify” around 600 and not to facilitate a single return, Dhaka reportedly plans to send a second list, of 10,000.

Bangladesh rightly insists on the refugees’ right of return. Ethnic cleansing is never acceptable and any country that forces minority populations out should remain under constant pressure to reverse course and bring those forced to leave safely back to their homes.

But this is not the time for Bangladesh to be putting forward thousands of names of Rohingya to go back to the villages that Myanmar authorities have burned and bulldozed, erasing evidence of their crimes against humanity.

Before the start of actual returns, Myanmar should agree to a set of prerequisites for return, including unfettered, independent monitoring of returnees, free movement, restoration of lost homes and properties, and access to services.

Myanmar officials should also take substantive steps to rectify the discriminatory policies which have been used to persecute the Rohingya minority for decades, starting with denial of citizenship.

Refugee return also cannot be divorced from the question of impunity for the crimes that caused the refugees to flee.

Myanmar needs to allow access to independent investigators, the media, and the UN-mandated fact-finding mission and special rapporteur. Repatriation is not an end in itself, but part of a process of reintegration that involves a government’s commitment to respecting rights and the rule of law, truth-seeking, and accountability for past crimes.

At the proper time, Bangladesh should put forward the names of refugees who freely choose to return to Myanmar. There will need to be full and accurate information about conditions back home with transparency throughout the process by all parties, including facilitation and monitoring by the UN refugee agency.

But now is not the time.

While keeping pressure on Myanmar to allow the Rohingya to return home is understandable, putting forward another list of 10,000 names for return risks being a distraction from the more immediate imperative as the rainy season approaches.

The urgent priority now is to keep vulnerable refugees safe from flooding and the outbreak of disease. No one should backtrack in insisting on Rohingya refugees’ right of return, but much more needs to be done before they can safely, voluntarily, and sustainably return home to Myanmar.

In the meantime, there’s work to be done.

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On Monday, International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Fatou Bensouda asked the court’s judges to rule on whether the ICC “can exercise jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh.”

Bangladesh is a member of the ICC, but Myanmar isn’t. This distinction is critical because, since the ICC lacks jurisdiction over Myanmar, the most obvious path to justice for victims of crimes committed against ethnic Rohingya is through a United Nations Security Council referral to the court.

The prosecutor’s legal argument – the first ever request of its kind – is an attempt to assert jurisdiction over “deportation,” one of the well-documented crimes attributed to Myanmar’s armed forces against the Rohingya. It is based on the ICC’s ability to assert jurisdiction if the “conduct in question” for a deportation was committed on the territory of a member state. Since crossing a border is a legally required element of the crime of deportation, Bensouda argues, victims being forced to cross into the territory of Bangladesh would be a part of that “conduct.”

It’s for the judges to decide on the merits of the argument. But the prosecutor’s decision to seek a ruling on whether the ICC can act based on existing jurisdiction speaks to the gravity of the situation.

Regardless, the Security Council shouldn’t wait on a ruling to exercise their authority to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC.

The mass flight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into Bangladesh – more than 670,000, according to the UN – is only one aspect of the Myanmar security forces’ brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing.

In addition to deportation, Human Rights Watch research found abuses in Rakhine State amounting to crimes against humanity of murder and attempted murder, rape and other sexual assault, forced population transfers, and persecution. One UN official warned the Security Council of the widespread and systematic use of sexual violence“as a tool of dehumanization and collective punishment.” The UN human rights expert on Myanmar said last month that she was increasingly of the opinion that events in Myanmar “bear the hallmarks of genocide.”

The Security Council should refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC so that the thousands of victims of horrific crimes have a chance at justice. On the contrary, for the council to do nothing would give Myanmar’s military a free pass to continue their ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya with impunity.

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These garment workers died making the clothes we wear, and we as consumers owe it to their legacy to make sure the reforms enacted in their names are durable and effective. 

Within five years of the building collapse, one of two large private fire and building safety initiatives in Bangladesh—the Alliance on Bangladesh Worker Safety (Alliance), a safety effort mostly led by North American brands—announced that it is preparing to wrap up and hand over operations to an “independent, credible, locally-led organization,” developed in partnership with the Bangladesh government and the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA).

The other private initiative—the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety (Accord), led mostly by European brands has extended its work till 2021, saying its operations would continue “beyond May 2018 as all parties recognize, substantial additional capacity-building is necessary before responsibility to protect workers in factories producing for Accord signatory brands can be responsibly handed over to a national regulatory body.” The extended Accord includes small yet concrete improvements that give protections for workers’ freedom of association more teeth.

These two initiatives, both led by reputed brands, came to very different conclusions about what has changed in the past five years, which raises the question—why?

Could it be that having workers centrally involved in designing and contributing to the administration of an initiative offers a worker perspective that can better inform decisions about whether to “transition” or stay? To be clear—workers are not just “any” stakeholder in such decisions. They stand on a different footing from other “stakeholders” because they risk paying with their lives and limb.

Worker participation in such initiatives should not be a box checking exercise. When it comes to initiatives that can save workers from dying, participation within an enforceable framework agreement—as is the case with the Accord—allows worker representatives to negotiate protection until they are satisfied that the outcomes contain meaningful procedures to enhance workplace safety.  

Brands pinning their hopes on a “quick transition” should be realistic. The Bangladesh government has created a committee to periodically assess whether the stage for “transitioning” from the Accord has been set. In the interim, joining the Accord offers the best available worker protection program.

First, the Bangladesh government has not shown the kind of “measurable progress” that would demonstrate that locally led initiatives developed in partnership with the government are capable of assuring factory safety.

In May 2017 Bangladesh authorities set up the Remediation Coordination Cell to oversee progress on fire and building safety in garment factories not covered by the Accord and Alliance. Data reported in February 2018 shows that only 3 percent of the 754 government-inspected factories corrected all fire and building safety concerns; less than 15 percent of factories implemented half the fixes needed to make factories safe. To date, the Bangladesh government’s public reporting on progress has been dismal, falling far short of the kind of transparency adopted by the Accord and Alliance, which not just claimed progress, but reported hard facts.

Last year, I tried to find out what happened to factories that were terminated from the Accord or the Alliance. What steps did the government take to make these factories safe or shut them down? Where were the workers? How did they cope when factories shut down and workers lost their jobs?

After speaking to workers from a handful of factories that were terminated from the Accord for being repeat defaulters, we discovered that most workers continued working in extremely unsafe factories. They did not know where or how to look for another job in a safer factory. Moreover, the Bangladesh government did not appear to be temporarily suspending these factories’ operations—let alone closing them down.

A March 2018 digital database launched by the Bangladesh government continues to show as “registered” a number of factories terminated from the Accord or Alliance for failing to make progress on fire and building safety without making clear what this means—were these factories made safe—and if so, from what date? Most recently, government authorities even got called out by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for their ongoing failures on fire and building safety.

Brand representatives should look for transparent and detailed reporting by local authorities regarding measures taken to remediate or shut down unsafe factories, including those terminated from the Accord and Alliance. Until now, there has been no such information. Such reporting would indicate the preparedness of the Bangladesh government to adopt and replicate one of the strongest features of the Alliance and the Accord—transparent and periodic reporting of progress—an important check against backsliding and corruption.

Second, a credible complaints process is one of the most important value-added of the private initiatives. The track record of the Bangladesh government when it comes to complaints resolution is especially poor—and brands should be looking more closely at not just numbers but how these complaints are resolved. In the past, the International Labor Organization has repeatedly criticized the Bangladesh authorities’ dismal record of resolving complaints concerning unfair labor practices by factories.

Similarly, watching how the Bangladesh government and industry respect factory unions and facilitate mature industry relations is an important indicator of whether transition can work. The Bangladesh government’s approach to industrial relations needs to fundamentally shift course. There are key indicators to assess this course correction. Its medieval and brutal tactics of forcibly disappearing workers and union organizers, or arresting journalists who simply write about labor rights needs to end.

In 2012, a union organizer from the Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity named Aminul Islam disappeared. Days later, his dead body surfaced. It was widely believed that Bangladesh’s security forces were involved in his abduction and murder. But security forces responsible were never held accountable and only a former garment worker who was last known to have called Aminul Islam away from his office before he disappeared was convicted earlier this month.

Similarly, in December 2016, brands threatened to boycott an apparel industry event in Dhaka to get the Bangladesh government to back down from its arbitrary arrests and false criminal cases against union organizers and labor activists following the Ashulia wage protests in the outskirts of Dhaka.

Brands that are serious about transitioning to a credible locally-led system will watch closely how well their supplier factories respect and promote freedom of association, and whether the Bangladesh government abandons its course of misusing criminal laws to muzzle union organizers and leaders.

Third, while the Accord is a much-needed human rights risk prevention, mitigation, and remediation program for workers, it also affords legal risk mitigation for apparel companies who are sourcing from Bangladesh with its credible inspections, monitoring and complaints mechanism for workers, and transparent reporting of progress. According to early April data, 140 apparel companies from amongst the more than 220 original signatories signed the extended Accord, covering 1332 factories.

Finally, companies can show the world that by signing up to the Accord, they value worker lives after the Rana Plaza calamity.  

There is no better way to mark this tragic anniversary.  

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Workers at Rana Plaza were forced to enter the damaged building on April 24, 2013 – they had complained the day before about sounds coming from obvious cracks in the building – which then collapsed on them.

Kalpona Akhter, a leading labor rights activist, recalls rushing to the scene. She spoke to a mother whose son was still alive under the rubble; he had texted her. He died, still waiting to be rescued. The Rana Plaza tragedy focused the world’s attention on Bangladesh’s garment industry, which has made many women their family bread-winners and been an economic lifeline for many people. But these gains have often come at an enormous cost to workers. At the time of the tragedy, few workers received fair wages, fair and decent working conditions, the right to unionize without retribution, and – as Rana Plaza showed us – to have safe working conditions.

These minimum standards should be part and parcel of garment workers’ working lives. Since Rana, the government and many of the major brands that source from Bangladesh has taken some steps to correct these wrongs. Others have resisted. One group of foreign brands is largely formed of European companies and is known as the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Safety; the second is largely composed of Northern American brands and known as the Alliance on Bangladesh Worker Safety. While each has insisted on strengthening safety measures, much remains to be done to protect labor rights.

But brands need to remain vigilant and engaged or risk a repeat. Anything less would be a terrible injustice to those who died five years ago on April 24, 2013.

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A pregnant garment worker had been caught sneaking mangoes into the factory despite a rule forbidding food on the production floor. Her fellow workers galvanized around a simple demand: to have a separate area to store and eat snacks during breaks.

I don’t know if these workers were ultimately given a snack area. But I do know that workers’ needs, as well as their health and safety, is better addressed if workers can exercise their right to freedom of association. This was true for the hundreds of workers I have met in Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Burma, and is something we should keep in mind today, on World Day on Worker Health and Safety.

I remember sitting with a worker in Cambodia who wept bitterly because her paltry earning made it difficult to feed her baby. Her factory had no union. Yet in another factory with a strong union, worker representatives had negotiated a small “milk powder” allowance for mothers of infants.

Worker representatives have advanced creative solutions in collective bargaining agreements. These include paid sick leave for antenatal care for pregnant workers; creating a “rotating” worker position designed to replace tired or sick workers for short periods without “disrupting” production; and adjusting the working hours of pregnant women so they could avoid uncomfortable rush hour commutes.

Apparel brands should conduct freedom of association risk assessments in their supply chains. Hiring third party monitors to do so is not enough. They should count the unions in each supplier factory and see if any collective bargaining agreements exist at the factory level. If none do, brands should find out if workers are being intimidated or pressured to not organize.

Increasingly, brands are signing framework agreements with global unions to promote freedom of association. This is good. But these also need transparency. A good model is the approach taken by the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety.

All companies—including those that have signed such agreements like H&M, ASOS, Tchibo, and Inditex, which owns Zara—should publicly report their progress on freedom of association and share good practices.

Freedom of association can be a bridge enabling workers to have a mango snack, as well as a safe, healthy, and decent workplace.

This spring marks a solemn milestone. More than five years have passed since a series of deadly fire and building accidents in Pakistan and Bangladesh together killed more than 1,500 workers and injured thousands more.

In the aftermath of these disasters, labor advocates ploughed through debris and dead bodies or interviewed traumatized workers to get them to recall brand names. That image underscored just how woefully inadequate apparel brands’ approach to worker rights had been.

Five years later, we still need more information about the brands that workers produce for, to ensure that workers’ rights are respected, and their safety protected.

Brand-label information matters not just for fire and building safety. The $2.4 trillion apparel industry, which  predominantly employs women as garment workers, witnesses a host of labor abuses. These range from poor wages to factory owners and managers denying paid maternity benefits or even firing pregnant workers to  harassment of union leaders to forced overtime work to workplace sexual harassment.

The governments of producing countries worldwide are primarily responsible for working conditions and labor law compliance. But under international standards, global apparel and footwear companies also have a responsibility to ensure that the rights of workers are respected throughout their supply chain.

One of the key building blocks for better working conditions is more visibility. Brands should make sure workers and the public know which factories are producing for which brands. Some companies sidestep this responsibility, but more and more companies are now disclosing key information.

In 2016, Human Rights Watch joined eight international labor rights groups and global unions advocating for a basic level of transparency in the garment industry. The coalition developed a “Transparency Pledge,” a uniform minimum standard for transparency, drawn from industry good practices. The pledge is a modest starting point for company disclosure.

At least 17 leading companies have committed to publishing all the information sought in the pledge. Another 18 companies, though falling short of pledge standards, committed, for the first time, to publishing their supplier factory information.

Today, a number of leading companies, including Adidas, ASOS, Benetton, C&A, Esprit, Gap Inc., H&M, Hugo Boss, Levi’s, Marks and Spencer, New Balance, Nike, Patagonia, Primark, and Puma, have disclosed at least the names and addresses of their supplier factories.

But a vast majority of the industry, including big companies like Walmart—which co-founded the Sustainable Apparel Coalition—and other fast-fashion leaders like Inditex (owns Zara), Mango, Desigual, Urban Outfitters, and Forever 21  are among those that still do not publicly disclose which factories produce their branded clothes.

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When an apparel company publicly discloses its production sites, it allows monitoring where it is most needed. Workers need this information, as do those who may advocate on their behalf, including union representatives, local and international nongovernmental organizations, lawyers, journalists, and academics.

The more supply chain data is publicly available, the more likely it is that abusive conditions will be reported—whether publicly or to the brands whose supply chains are implicated—and the more likely it becomes that problems can be solved.

Transparency not only provides workers and advocates critical information about where to turn with problems. It builds confidence among consumers who care about the ethical business practices and allows workers to hope that brands profiting from their labor will hear of their struggles—and intervene.

Brand Arguments

Some brands that reject transparency invoke the oft-repeated trope of competitive disadvantage. But leading companies that already disclose factory information have not said they suffer any financial harm as a result. And publishing supplier factory information would allow brands sourcing from the same factory to potentially collaborate to prevent labor abuses or dangerous conditions.

Some brands say their membership in initiatives like the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety, a binding agreement between brands and global unions forged after the Rana Plaza collapse, proves their commitment to transparency. The initiative has had a positive impact on fire and building safety in Bangladesh. Joining the Bangladesh Accord is important—more brands should join the extended Accord with its improved protections for workers’ freedom of association. But the Accord, which is limited to Bangladesh, is no substitute for a company’s own transparency practices governing its global supplier factories.

It bears repeating that even the best fire and building safety program will not solve many of the labor abuses women workers face in factories. Women workers not only endure poor working conditions but also find it harder to climb up the ranks of workers, performing supervisory roles. Apparel companies should invest in all channels that allow workers to report labor abuses and seek redress. Transparency is one more—yet powerful vehicle—that can be effectively used to help workers by labor advocates.

At least one company, Inditex (which owns Zara and other brands), has refused to publish the names and addresses of its supplier factories, arguing that it privately discloses the data to global unions with which it signed an agreement to improve working conditions throughout its supplier factories. But publishing supplier factory information would only amplify the effectiveness of such a framework agreement, as other brands like H&M, Tchibo, and ASOS have shown.

Nowhere to Hide

Investors, including pension funds, can use their role as owners to press for transparency and gender-sensitive workplaces. Investor groups such as SHARE Canada and the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility regularly engage with companies on supply-chain transparency. It is not just a social imperative, but can help reduce their financial risks.

“Soon there won’t be much to hide,” John Ruggie, the former UN special representative for business and human rights told Human Rights Watch. He noted the increasing weight investors are giving to economic, social, and governance indicators. “People who are either inside or servicing the investment community will vacuum up everything that’s out there. They are using everything from GPS to Google Earth to collect information.”

Multi-stakeholder initiatives should make supply chain disclosure a part of the criteria for ongoing apparel companies’ membership in such initiatives. Governments should also compel transparency and other mandatory human rights processes in an apparel company’s supply chain. Only governments can impose penalties and set enforceable standards.

Tragically, the combination of reluctance to regulate companies and overall government apathy has meant there have not been strong legislative efforts worldwide to address human rights concerns in the garment industry. Legislation that specifically requires apparel and footwear companies to publish supplier factory information would be an important step. 

Nevertheless, there are increasing attempts by some governments to legislate on company responsibilities. The UK Modern Slavery Act, which requires companies to monitor for modern slavery in their supply chains, does not specifically require companies to publish supplier factory information. But it has led a number of UK apparel and footwear companies to publish supplier factory information as part of theira overall risk mitigation strategy on modern slavery in their supply chains. A French law that requires companies to engage in human rights due diligence is another good example that can be built on.

As consumers, we owe it to those who produce our clothes and shoes to demand that their locations be publicized. So please spend a few minutes to check if your favorite brands are already transparent, and ask them why if not.

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Over the last nine months some 700,000 ethnic Rohingya in Burma have been driven from their homes across the border into Bangladesh by the Burmese military. The attacks have been described by the UN as “a textbook case of ethnic cleansing”, while Human Rights Watch and others found the atrocities amount to “crimes against humanity”. Yet the international response to this crisis has been woefully inadequate. Britain, which has traditionally led on Burma on the UN Security Council, carries a particular responsibility for this failure. In a sharp critique, the British parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee said recently that the Government’s diplomatic leadership on Burma “has struggled to achieve a clear sense of direction and has so far had meagre results”.

Last week’s trip by the UN Security Council to Bangladesh and Burma, to see and hear for themselves the plight of the Rohingya, was supposed to produce a more concerted and effective international response. Britain should have led the way in promoting this.  But initial public statements by representatives to the UN Security Council, especially Britain, suggest that this critical opportunity was missed.

Although Bangladesh is hosting nearly a million refugees, and Britain and other donors are providing large amounts of humanitarian aid, overall international efforts are falling short, with some of the most vulnerable Rohingya still not receiving the support they need. Human Rights Watch documented dozens of Burmese soldiers raping Rohingya women and girls as part of their campaign of ethnic cleansing, including horrific gang rapes.  Yet their suffering and trauma continues. There are some 40,000 pregnant women and girls among the Rohingya refugee population, some of them raped by Burmese soldiers, and some are due to give birth in the coming weeks.  But Andrew Gilmour, a UN Assistant Secretary General, lamented recently that camps are not providing proper care or protection for them, and that survivors’ access to support - especially psychological and reproductive health services - is too limited.

It is commendable that a senior UN official should speak out in this way. But where is Britain’s voice? For nearly five years, the British government has said that combatting sexual violence in conflict is a high priority, and it created the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative to implement that commitment. But faced with widespread rape against the Rohingya and with survivors’ huge need for care and support, Britain has not showed the decisive global leadership on this issue that the PSVI promised.

Britain should be helping to lead a strengthened international response in respect of refugee returns. None of the Rohingya will have forgotten the death, destruction and terror that forced them to flee their homes, or the profound discrimination and persecution they have experienced for generations in Burma. They will only return voluntarily to Burma when there is a fundamental change in these conditions. At a minimum, that means security guarantees, freedom of movement, an end to discriminatory citizenship laws, livelihood opportunities, and the return of stolen homes or compensation for those destroyed.  The Burmese military and hostile elements of the Burmese government will not concede these changes easily. It will take sustained and increased international pressure, of the kind that has been sorely lacking to date. One very concrete step that Britain and other EU states should take is the early imposition of targeted sanctions on senior figures in the Burmese military.  Other states should be encouraged to adopt similar measures.

A clear and consistent international position on accountability and justice is also crucial. Astonishingly, Britain’s representative to the UN, Karen Pierce, suggested this week that the Burmese government might undertake another domestic inquiry into the crimes committed against the Rohingya and that it should be supported in doing so. This is absurd. Is Ms Pierce really unaware of the Burmese military’s long history of impunity for mass killings and sexual violence? In the midst of the current crisis, the Burmese military has released two reports denying all accusations of rape and killings by its own security forces, and last week Min Aung Hlaing, the army’s Commander-in-Chief, denied that the Burmese military has ever, in its entire history, committed rape. Pierce also repeated Suu Kyi’s cynical claim that her government is willing to “look” at any evidence provided, an offer belied by Burma’s refusal to allow access to the UN Fact-Finding Mission established by the Human Rights Council.

If it is serious about justice for the Rohingya, as its claims to be, the British government should work with other Security Council members to press for a Council resolution that refers Burma to the International Criminal Court.This will not be easy. But there is often no quick route to justice. It would be a shameful betrayal of the Rohingya not to vigorously pursue every opportunity to bring to account those responsible for the heinous crimes committed against them.

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A proposed Digital Security Bill to replace the existing abusive law, however, is in some respects even broader than the one it seeks to replace, and violates the country’s international obligation to protect freedom of speech.

Bangladesh will undergo scrutiny of its human rights record at the United Nations Human Rights Council on May 14, 2018, as part of a process known as the Universal Periodic Review. The government should take this opportunity to commit to ending its crackdown on dissent and criticism, including that made by the political opposition, and instead, pledge to lead a robust public campaign on the right to free expression. This should include taking strong action against militant groups who seek to suppress free speech by engaging in violent attacks on those holding different religious views, Human Rights Watch said.

“The government of Bangladesh acknowledges that the current section 57 of the ICT Act is draconian, and needs to go,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “But the new law being proposed is hardly an improvement, creating a series of new offences that will undoubtedly be used for years to come against government critics in the country’s highly politicized criminal justice system.”

The 89-page report, “No Place for Criticism: Bangladesh Crackdown on Social Media Commentary” details dozens of arbitrary arrests since the Information and Communication Technology Act 2006 was amended in 2013 to incorporate harsher penalties and allowing the police to make arrests without warrant. As of April 2018, the police had submitted 1,271 charge sheets to the Cyber Tribunal in Dhaka, claiming sufficient evidence to prosecute under section 57 of the ICT Act.

Scores of people have been detained for months at a time before being released pending trial, some simply for political criticism in Facebook posts or for caricaturing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed, her relatives, and colleagues. Others were arrested for offending religious sentiment or for defamation.

Section 57 of ICT Act authorizes the prosecution of any person who publishes, in electronic form, material that is fake and obscene; defamatory; “tends to deprave and corrupt” its audience; causes, or may cause, “deterioration in law and order;” prejudices the image of the state or a person; or “causes or may cause hurt to religious belief.” The 2013 amendments eliminated the need for arrest warrants and official permission to prosecute, restricted the use of bail to release detainees pending trial, and increased prison terms if convicted. A new Cyber Tribunal dedicated to dealing with offences under the ICT Act was also established. As a result, the number of complaints to the police, arrests, and prosecutions has soared.

May 9, 2018Report

No Place for Criticism

Bangladesh Crackdown on Social Media Commentary

• Download the full report in English
• Download the annex of the report

Bangladeshi citizens have been arrested for criticizing the prime minister’s clothes, her foreign policy, her party, or the actions of her cabinet colleagues. The police have acted on complaints made by her political supporters or even on their own. For instance, in April 2018, after a student protest at Dhaka university, a police officer filed a complaint referring to 43 “provocative” Facebook posts, which “many have liked and commented on” that “created a situation which could potentially harm society and create chaos,” and proposed action under section 57.

In April 2017, Monirul Islam, a rubber plantation worker in Srimongol, was arrested for “liking” a Facebook post that criticized the ongoing official visit of the prime minister to India, after a party supporter filed a police complaint saying he “was extremely hurt and agitated.”

Press freedom is also under threat from section 57. Many journalists and editors have been arrested for online articles alleging corruption, maladministration, or criticizing particular individuals. In June 2017, police arrested Golam Mostafa Rafiq, editor of Habiganj Samachar, for an article published in the online edition of the newspaper which speculated a ruling party MP would not get the party nomination.

In July 2017, numerous journalists protested the arrest of Abdul Latif Moral for allegedly “sharing” an article on Facebook, reporting that a goat given as part of a relief initiative had died, with the “intention to defame the minister.”

While the Cyber Tribunal provides no official data on the number of convictions and acquittals, anecdotal evidence suggests few people have been convicted to date. However, the mere fact that people are being arrested and detained for online speech is likely to have a chilling effect on speech and dissent, regardless of whether those individuals are ultimately convicted.

Acknowledging that section 57 has been misused, the government has proposed to replace the law with a new Digital Security Act that they argue places some checks and balances on arrests over speech. However, the bill currently being considered by parliament will continue to significantly restrict freedom of speech in Bangladesh, Human Rights Watch said.

Some provisions of the proposed new law are even more draconian than those in section 57. Bangladesh’s journalists are concerned that the proposed law includes provisions that will treat the use of secret recordings to expose corruption and other crimes as espionage, arguing it will restrict investigative journalism and muzzle media freedom. The bill sets out prison terms for vague offenses like publishing “aggressive or frightening” information and would also impose sentences of up to 10 years in prison for posting information that “ruins communal harmony, or creates instability or disorder, or disturbs or is about to disturb the law and order situation,” overbroad language that opens the door to further abuses.

Also concerning is a provision in the proposed law that would impose life imprisonment for those convicted of “negative propaganda and campaign against liberation war of Bangladesh or spirit of the liberation war or Father of the Nation.” The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the independent expert body that monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – to which Bangladesh is a party – has said laws that penalize opinions about historical facts are incompatible with a country’s obligations to respect freedom of opinion and expression.

Bangladesh should hold civil society consultations to ensure that any new law passed to replace section 57 is compatible with its obligations under international law, and protects and respects freedom of speech, Human Rights Watch said. Criminalization of speech offenses should be limited to the worst cases, such as direct incitement to violence, and not for criticism of the authorities or defamation.

“Bangladesh authorities should accept that criticism, however unpleasant and hurtful, is part of public life and can serve to correct mistakes and provide redress,” said Adams. “The government should work with domestic and international experts to draft a new law that fully upholds the principles of free speech and internet freedom.”